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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, in Jaffee v. Redmond,1 the U.S. Supreme Court, pur-
suant to the authority set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 501, rec-
ognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the federal courts.2  In 
doing so, the Court acknowledged the essential role that confiden-
tiality plays in a therapist-patient relationship and also recognized 
the important role that psychotherapy plays in the mental health of 
the American citizenry.3  However, in dicta set out in a footnote near 
the conclusion of the opinion (footnote 19 of the opinion), the Court 
suggested that the privilege might not be absolute, that it might need 
to “give way [in situations where] . . . a serious threat of harm to the 
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by 
the therapist.”4 
In the years since this decision, the lower federal courts have 
wrestled with how to determine the contours of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s com-
ments contained within footnote 19.  Currently, the federal circuit 
courts are split over whether the Court intended to establish a dan-
gerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and 
the situations in which this exception would be appropriate.  A year 
  
 1. 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 2. Id. at 9–10. 
 3. Id. at 10–11. 
 4. Id. at 18 n.19. 
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and a half after Jaffee was decided, the Tenth Circuit, in United 
States v. Glass,5 crafted a dangerous-patient exception to the privi-
lege, which was fashioned after the criteria set forth by the Jaffee 
Court in footnote 19.6  However, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have 
refused to recognize the exception on the grounds that the footnote is 
dicta and that a dangerous-patient exception contravenes the ratio-
nale and the holding of the Jaffee opinion.7 
This article addresses the dangerous-patient exception to the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege and argues against the recognition of 
this exception.  Parts I and II of this article present a discussion of 
the history of privileges and the development of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, culminating with an in-depth discussion of the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Jaffee.  This section also includes a brief 
discussion of the two distinct rationales supporting privileges: the 
deontological rationale and the utilitarian rationale espoused by 
Dean John Henry Wigmore and adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court.   
Part III of this article presents the opinions of the federal circuit 
courts that have grappled with the question of whether to recognize 
the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege.   
In Part IV, this article sets forth reasons why the Glass court and 
the other courts that have adopted the Glass test are wrong.  It ex-
plains that the comments set forth in the Jaffee footnote are mere 
obiter dicta and, thus, have negligible value.  It also demonstrates 
that interpreting this footnote as authorizing a dangerous-patient ex-
ception is wholly inconsistent with the Jaffee opinion and the Su-
preme Court’s sanctioning of the legislative history of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501, particularly the proposed but rejected rules related 
to privileges.  Part IV also argues that the Glass court erred in craft-
ing the test by failing to conduct the proper legal analysis in light of 
the privileges that the Supreme Court set forth in Jaffee and, two 
years later, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States.8 
  
 5. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 6. Id. at 1359. 
 7. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2003); United 
States  v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 8. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
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Part IV also addresses the “reason and experience” requirement 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that privileges are 
to be governed by the principles of the common law “as they may be 
interpreted by the [federal] courts . . . in light of reason and expe-
rience.”9  This section presents the reasons why “reason and expe-
rience” do not support the recognition of the dangerous-patient ex-
ception to the privilege.  It shows not only that there is no clear con-
sensus among the states with respect to a therapist’s duty to protect 
third parties, but also that there is much confusion among the laws of 
the states with respect to the dangerous-patient exception.  Finally, 
this section examines the “reason and experience” requirement of 
Rule 501 in light of the commonly recognized exceptions to the oth-
er federal communication privileges.  It concludes that because nei-
ther the attorney-client privilege, the spousal privilege, nor the cler-
gy-penitent privilege are subject to a “dangerous-person” exception, 
“reason and experience” do not support the recognition of this type 
of exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.   
Part V of this article discusses the limited situations in which a 
therapist might be compelled to testify about a patient’s confidential 
communications.  This article concludes with a discussion of, and 
recommendation for, procedures that courts should follow when pre-
sented with challenges to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  It 
recommends that courts conduct in camera review of the evidence 
proffered in support of exceptions to the privilege and require that 
the proponent of the exception prove the necessary elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  These procedures will provide pro-
tection against the needless public disclosure of confidential patient 
information and serve to protect the confidentiality of the therapist-
patient relationship, which the Jaffee Court recognized is a “sine qua 
non for successful psychiatric treatment.”10    
  
 9. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 10. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996). 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PRIVILEGES11 
Privileges are a unique aspect of the law of evidence; unlike oth-
er rules of evidence designed to improve the reliability of the fact-
finding process, the rules governing the scope and effect of privileg-
es operate to “impede the search for truth by excluding evidence that 
may be highly probative.”12  Privileges are justified by the need to 
protect the privacy of certain relationships and the need to encourage 
open communications within these relationships.13  The most com-
mon privileges include an individual’s right to be free from com-
pelled self-incrimination and the privileges that protect confidential 
communications between spouses, attorneys and their clients, and 
physicians and their patients.14  The law of privileges has developed 
from several sources.  Some privileges are provided for in the Con-
stitution, such as the privilege against self-incrimination.15  In the 
states, privileges are generally statutory, whereas the federal law of 
privileges originates from the common law.16  One of the earliest 
privileges to be recognized was the Roman law that refused to com-
pel an attorney to testify against his client during the pendency of a 
case.17  Additional privileges came into existence during the early 
Middle Ages, beginning with recognition of the priest-penitent privi-
lege.18  This privilege, which had its origin in the seal of confession 
  
 11. Certain sections within Parts II and III of this article are taken from a pre-
vious article written by the author.  See Deborah Paruch, The Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege in the Family Court: An Exemplar of Disharmony Between So-
cial Policy Goals, Professional Ethics, and the Current State of the Law, 29 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 499, 501–521 (2009)  
 12. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.1, at 
329 (3d ed. 2003). 
 13. Id. 
 14. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 114 (John 
W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 2006).  
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 16. PAUL C. GIANELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE, § 37.04, at 566 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 17. Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Pro-
fessional Secret, 39 SW. L.J. 661, 667 (1985). 
 18. Id. at 668–69. 
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and canon law, prohibited priests from revealing confessional confi-
dences.19   
The first privilege recognized under the common law of England 
was the attorney-client privilege, which was initially recognized dur-
ing the reign of Elizabeth I20 and “[b]y the time of the American 
Revolution . . . was firmly entrenched in the [American] common 
law.”21  The rationale for this privilege was that it was a “point of 
honor” for gentlemen to not reveal confidences entrusted to them.22  
These early privileges are grounded in deontology,23 the school of 
ethics that focuses on the inherent rightness or wrongness of actions 
themselves, as opposed to the correctness or incorrectness of the 
consequences of the actions.24  The deontological approach to privi-
  
 19. Id. at 668.  Some contemporary scholars believe that that common law of 
England did not recognize the priest-penitent privilege.  See id. at 670 n.40 (citing 
Edward A. Hogan, Jr., A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 
LOY. L. REV. 1, 2, 13 (1951)). 
 20. Id. at 669–70.  Recognition of the attorney-client privilege followed the pas-
sage of the Statute of Elizabeth in 1562–1563 that provided penalties for a wit-
ness’s refusal to testify following service of process and offer of payment of ex-
penses.  Id. (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 2290, at 542–43 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)).  Historically, 
the attorney-client privilege belonged to the attorney “as a gentleman” with courts 
honoring a gentleman’s pledge of secrecy.  Comment, Functional Overlap Be-
tween the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged 
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1228 (1962) [hereinafter Function-
al Overlap].  This right was originally held by all gentlemen, “but during the 17th 
and 18th centuries it was gradually repudiated.”  Id.  Lawyers were able to retain 
the privilege by maintaining that the privilege, in fact, belonged to the client based 
on two different theories: “(1) that the privilege was necessary to assure complete 
disclosure by the client and a competent defense by the lawyer; and (2) that the 
lawyer was no better than a servant.”  Id. (citations omitted).  This latter theory is 
traced to an ancient rule that prohibited a slave from testifying against a master.  
Shuman, supra note 17, at 667. 
 21. Functional Overlap, supra note 20, at 1229. 
 22. Shuman, supra note 17, at 671. 
 23. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Privacy in Psychiatric Treatment: Threats and Res-
ponses, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1809, 1810–11 (2002) (discussing the school of 
deontological thought in relation to the psychotherapist-patient privilege problem). 
 24. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 63–64 (Susan Neiburg Terkel & R. Shannon Duv-
al eds., 1999).  There are two distinct categories of contemporary ethical theories: 
deontological and teleological: 
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leges focuses on the importance of the societal values encompassed 
in the privilege and recognizes that disclosure of certain confidences 
is in and of itself wrong.25  
The deontological school of thought views privacy as “an essen-
tial ingredient of a democratic society.”26  According to Professor 
David Louisell, privileges are “[p]rimarily . . . a right to be let alone, 
a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relation-
ships, from the state’s coercive or supervisory powers and from the 
nuisance of its eavesdropping.”27  Professor Louisell has also re-
marked that the fact that the existence of these guarantees sometimes 
results in the exclusion of probative evidence at a trial is merely a 
secondary and incidental feature of the privileges’ vitality and “not 
too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative rela-
tions—husband-wife, client-attorney and penitent-clergyman.”28   
  
Teleological, which encompasses utilitarianism, is the ‘ethics of ends and 
consequences.’  1 JOHN K. ROTH, ETHICS 367 (John K. Roth ed., 2005).  
Teleological theories prioritize the good over the right.  See id.  The good 
is defined as ‘the end or purpose of human actions; for example, ‘the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number.’  These theories evaluate mor-
al actions in terms of whether they contribute to the good.’  Id.  Thus, ac-
cording to teleological theories, consequences or results will determine 
the rightness or wrongness of moral actions.  Id.  This is contrasted with 
deontological theories, which argue for the ‘independence of the right 
from the good.’   
Id. at 364; Paruch, supra note 11, at 503 n.13. 
 25. Shuman, supra note 17, at 664 (quoting David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, 
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TULSA L. REV. 
101, 101 (1956)).  
 26. Id. at 666 (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1967)).  This 
concept of privacy was incorporated into the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution.  Justice Brandeis recognized this in his dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States, where he stated:  
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness . . . .  They sought to protect Americans in 
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They 
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 27. Louisell, supra note 25, at 110–11. 
 28. Id. at 109–10.  
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Some two hundred years after the attorney-client privilege was 
first recognized in English common law, the English courts were 
called upon to address the physician-patient privilege.  This occurred 
in the 1776 bigamy trial of Elizabeth, the Duchess of Kingston.29  
This decision is viewed as a critical turning point in the law of privi-
leges because it was then that courts began to apply a utilitarian test 
to privileges, where the importance of the evidence replaced ethics 
as the standard for recognition of privileges.30  In the utilitarian ap-
proach, also referred to as the instrumental rationale, privileges are 
viewed as obstructions to the truth-finding process and as fostering a 
disregard for the fundamental principle that “the public . . . has a 
right to every man’s evidence.”31 
The utilitarian approach was adopted by two of the giants in An-
glo-American evidence law, Jeremy Bentham and John Henry Wig-
more.32  Utilitarianism is the ethical principle maintaining that an 
action is right if it tends to maximize the happiness of everyone af-
fected by the action.33  Thus, the utilitarian focus is on the conse-
quences of an act rather than on the act’s intrinsic nature or the mo-
tives of the actor.34  Dean Wigmore was an empiricist who chal-
lenged the soundness of the deontological approach.35  He urged the 
courts to strictly construe existing privileges and identified four con-
ditions, which he believed were necessary, for the recognition of a 
privilege:  
  
 29. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 572–73 (H.L.) (Eng.). 
 30. Id.; WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2286, at 531. 
 31. See WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527; see also United States v. 
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
 32. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON 
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.5, 141–46 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing 
Bentham’s role in the transition to the modern privilege doctrine). 
 33. Utilitarianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB 
checked/topic/620682/utilitarianism (last visited Apr. 27, 2011). 
 34. Id.  Utilitarianism is a tradition originating from the eighteenth-and-
nineteenth-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill and holds that “an action is right if it tends to promote happiness 
and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness” for everyone affected by 
the action.  Id.; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789); JOHN 
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher ed., 1979) (4th ed. 1871). 
35. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527. 
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to 
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between 
the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the dis-
closure of the communications must be greater than the bene-
fit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.36     
The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted Wigmore’s test for the rec-
ognition of privileges, stating that privileges should be utilized “only 
to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or ex-
cluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the nor-
mally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascer-
taining truth.”37  The Court utilized this approach in recognizing the 
importance of the attorney-client privilege in Swidler & Berlin, find-
ing that “[t]he attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage ‘full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law 
and the administration of justice,’”38 and the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in Jaffee.39 
However, the utilitarian approach is not without its critics.  Au-
thors have challenged the behavioral assumptions underlying the 
  
 36. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527 (emphases omitted).  This oft-
quoted passage in Wigmore’s treatise has been viewed as the most important sec-
tion in his volume dedicated to privileges.  IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, §3.2.3, 
at 159. 
 37. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 38. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Up-
john Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). 
 39. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1996) (finding that the psychothe-
rapist-patient privilege was justified because the protection of confidential com-
munications between a patient and her therapist advances considerably important 
interests that outweigh the need for relevant evidence). 
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instrumental rationale, disputing the contention that people would 
refrain from consulting with attorneys or confiding in therapists 
without the promise of confidentiality.40  As such, legal scholars 
have questioned the soundness of employing the instrumental ratio-
nale to uphold a variety of communication privileges, including the 
attorney-client privilege,41 the clergy-penitent privilege,42 the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege,43 and the spousal-communications 
privilege.44  Additionally, exclusive reliance on the utilitarian model 
for the recognition of privileges has been criticized on the grounds 
that it is “too narrow and legalistic a basis on which to erect privi-
lege doctrine.”45   
More recently, the focus of some legal scholars has been on the 
broader concept of human autonomy, the freedom to control one’s 
own life and destiny, which has been defined as an ultimate moral 
good in society.46  Similarly, other commentators have suggested 
that the best arguments for the preservation of privileges are those 
based on the instrumental rationales as well as rationales evolving 
  
40. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption 
Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 145 (2004). 
 41. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 5.2.1, at 300 (citing RICHARD O. LEMPERT 
& STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 614 (1977)). 
 42. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5612, at 87–88 (1992) (noting that the instrumental case 
for the clergy-penitent privilege is weak). 
 43. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 5.2.2, at 313–35 (giving a detailed pres-
entation of the empirical studies dealing with the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege).  
 44. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2332, at 643–44.  Wigmore believed that there 
was no convincing data that the spousal-communication privilege was necessary to 
aid communication between spouses.  Id.  
 45. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 5.2.3, at 335.  Professor Edward Imwinke-
lried has developed and proposed a humanistic rationale for the recognition of 
privileges derived from the constitutional right to autonomy.  See id. § 5.2.3, at 
335–38.  Under his proposal, the positive theory of freedom is a normative propo-
sition as contrasted with an empirical hypothesis, and his theory or rationale for 
the recognition of privileges is tested by examining the theory’s consistency with 
liberal democratic theory as opposed to subjecting it to experimentation and scien-
tific examination.  See id. § 5.2.3, at 338.  
 46. Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Really Have Life 
Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165, 1174–75 (1999). 
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from considerations of privacy, loyalty, and human dignity.47  For 
instance, in the attorney-client context, it is argued that communica-
tions ought to be protected from disclosure not only because the free 
flow of information may be improved because of the privilege but 
also because individuals should be entitled to have attorneys advise 
them on legal matters without the fear that the information commu-
nicated can be revealed by means of a subpoena.48  Likewise, even 
though communications between a therapist and her patient may be 
enhanced by the existence of a privilege, the protection of these con-
fidences should be justified on the basis that public disclosure of 
these types of communications, even though needed to resolve a le-
gal dispute, “would be repugnant to most of society.”49 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
The historical foundation of psychotherapeutic confidentiality is 
thought to be the Hippocratic Oath, which is not surprising given 
psychiatry’s origin within the medical profession.50  The Hippocratic 
Oath states in part: “Whatsoever I see or hear in the course of my 
profession as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with 
men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never di-
vulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.”51  The right of indi-
viduals to control the disclosure of personal medical information is 
also closely tied to the notion of personal privacy that was first ac-
knowledged as a legal concept in the United States at the end of the 
nineteenth century.52 
  
47. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privi-
leges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 796 (2002). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  For an in-depth discussion of the constitutional right of privacy as a ra-
tionale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see Steven R. Smith, Constitu-
tional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
 50. Howard B. Roback & Mary Shelton, Effects of Confidentiality Limitations on 
the Psychotherapeutic Process, 4 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. & RES. 185, 185 
(1995). 
 51. Id. 
 52. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 43, 297 (4th ed. 2004).  As initially conceived by Justice 
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A.  Early Recognition of the Privilege 
In 1952, the Illinois Cook County Circuit Court became what 
some believe to be the first U.S. court to recognize a psychotherap-
ist-patient privilege.53  In Binder v. Ruvell,54 a prominent psychiatrist 
and a hospital were summoned to produce the medical records of 
Mrs. Binder, who was a recent patient at the hospital.55  The court 
ruled that the information provided by a patient to a psychiatrist dur-
ing psychotherapy sessions was protected from disclosure, even 
though the State of Illinois, at the time, did not recognize a physi-
cian-patient privilege.56  In determining whether Illinois law should 
recognize this new privilege, the court adopted the utilitarian ap-
proach and analyzed the psychotherapist-patient privilege in terms of 
the elements expounded by Dean Wigmore.57  It concluded that the 
protection of the confidences that arise in the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship far outweighed the “correct disposal of a particular 
case.”58 
During the mid-to-late-1950s, the idea that therapy patients 
might need unique legal protections took hold, and the concept of the 
  
Brandeis, the right of privacy is “[t]he right to be left alone.”  Louis D. Brandeis & 
Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).  
While some have argued that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is protected by 
the constitutional right to privacy, a liberty interest contained in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, these arguments have largely 
been unsuccessful.  Compare Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 251–52 (1996) 
(indicating the constitutional aspects of privilege as it relates to privacy), with 
Smith, supra note 49, at 4.  Additionally, Smith also argues that the First Amend-
ment protects therapeutic communications since “autonomous control over the 
development and expression of one’s intellect, interests, tastes, and personality” 
are rights protected by the First Amendment.  Smith, supra note 49, at 20 n.141 
(quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)) (em-
phasis omitted). 
 53. See Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1952), available at 
http://jaffee-redmond.org/cases/binder.htm. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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psychiatrist-patient privilege was actively debated.59  In 1960, the 
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (“GAP”) issued a report 
entitled Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Prac-
tice of Psychiatry, which included this frequently quoted passage 
that articulated the need for the privilege:  
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to 
maintain confidentiality.  His capacity to help his patients is 
completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to 
talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to 
function without being able to assure his patients of confi-
dentiality and, indeed, privileged communication . . . .  There 
is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for 
successful psychiatric treatment.  The relationship may well 
be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. 
Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their pa-
tients’ conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes 
as well.  Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond 
a patient’s awareness and, in order to do this, it must be poss-
ible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks suc-
cessful treatment.60 
The State of Connecticut was the first state to enact a psychothe-
rapist-patient privilege statute.61  The privilege applied in civil and 
criminal cases and covered communications between patients and 
psychotherapists.62  This Connecticut law ultimately formed the ba-
sis for the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent proposal for a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence.63 
  
 59. Paul W. Mosher, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The History and Signi-
ficance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in the Case of Jaffee v. Redmond 
(1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://jaffee-
redmond.org/articles/mosher.htm.   
 60. Id. (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF 
PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960) [hereinafter GAP REPORT]) (emphases omitted). 
 61. Id. (citing Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: 
The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 733, 733 
(1962)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.   
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B.  The Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence submitted to Congress 
in 1969 by the Supreme Court initially included provisions for the 
recognition of nine federal privileges, including a psychotherapist-
patient privilege, which was set forth in proposed Federal Rule of 
Evidence 504.64  The proposed rule protected confidential communi-
  
 64. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 
183, 240–41 (1972).  Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 reads: 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege [Not enacted.] 
(a) Definitions. 
(1) A ‘patient’ is a person who consults or is examined or inter-
viewed by a psychotherapist. 
(2) A ‘psychotherapist’ is (A) a person authorized to practice medi-
cine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, 
while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional 
condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified 
as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly 
engaged. 
(3) A communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed 
to third persons other than those present to further the interest of the pa-
tient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or persons reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are 
participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the 
psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege.  A patient has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential 
communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his 
mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, 
his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or 
treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members 
of the patient’s family. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege.  The privilege may be claimed by 
the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representa-
tive of a deceased patient.  The person who was the psychotherapist may 
claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient.  His authority so to 
do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
(d) Exceptions. 
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization.  There is no privilege under 
this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospi-
talize the patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of 
diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospi-
talization. 
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cations between patients and physicians or psychologists made for 
the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional condi-
tions.65  The rule contained three specific exceptions: There was no 
privilege for communications made pursuant to proceedings to hos-
pitalize a patient, for communications made in connection with 
court-ordered psychiatric examinations, or for communications made 
in connection with civil proceedings in which a patient introduced 
his mental condition into the case.66  The committee did not include 
an exception for dangerous patients.67  The omission was a delibe-
  
(2) Examination by order of judge.  If the judge orders an examina-
tion of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications 
made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect 
to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the 
judge orders otherwise. 
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense.  There is no privi-
lege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the men-
tal or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he re-
lies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the 
patient’s death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the con-
dition as an element of his claim or defense. 
Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 241.  
 67. Id. at 241–42.  The Advisory Committee Report provides: 
The case for the privilege is convincingly stated in Report No. 45, 
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 (1960): 
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain 
confidentiality.  His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent 
upon their willingness and ability to talk freely.  This makes it difficult if 
not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his pa-
tients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication.  Where 
there may be exceptions to this general rule . . ., there is wide agreement 
that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.  
The relationship may well be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the 
lawyer-client.  Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their pa-
tients’ conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well.  
Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient’s aware-
ness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely.  
A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment. 
Id. (quoting GAP REPORT, supra note 60, at 92) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
Later, the Advisory Committee Report goes on to say: “While many of the 
statutes simply place the communications on the same basis as those between at-
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rate decision.  The committee that drafted the Connecticut statute 
believed that patients willing to express to their therapists their inten-
tions to commit crimes were not likely to carry out their intentions; 
rather, they were making pleas for help.68 
  
torney and client, basic differences between the two relationships forbid resorting 
to attorney-client save as a helpful point of departure.”  Id. at 243 (citing Goldstein 
& Katz, supra note 61, at 736; WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2286 n.23, at 534–35) 
(internal citation omitted).  
The Advisory Committee also wrote: 
Subdivision (d).  The exceptions differ substantially from those of 
the attorney-client privilege, as a result of the basic differences in the re-
lationships.  While it has been argued convincingly that the nature of the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship demands complete security against 
legally coerced disclosure in all circumstances, . . . the committee of psy-
chiatrists and lawyers who drafted the Connecticut statute concluded that 
in three instances the need for disclosure was sufficiently great to justify 
the risk of possible impairment of the relationship . . . .  These three ex-
ceptions are incorporated in the present rule. 
(1) The interests of both patient and public call for a departure from 
confidentiality in commitment proceedings.  Since disclosure is autho-
rized only when the psychotherapist determines that hospitalization is 
needed, control over disclosure is placed largely in the hands of a person 
in whom the patient has already manifested confidence.  Hence damage 
to the relationship is unlikely. 
(2) In a court ordered examination, the relationship is likely to be an 
arm’s length one, though not necessarily so.  In any event, an exception is 
necessary for the effective utilization of this important and growing pro-
cedure.  The exception, it will be observed, deals with a court ordered ex-
amination rather than with a court appointed psychotherapist.  Also, the 
exception is effective only with respect to the particular purpose for 
which the examination is ordered.  The rule thus conforms with the provi-
sions of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 that no statement made by the accused in the 
course of an examination into competency to stand trial is admissible on 
the issue of guilt and of 42 U.S.C. § 3420 that a physician conducting an 
examination in a drug addiction commitment proceeding is a competent 
and compellable witness. 
(3) By injecting his condition into litigation, the patient must be said 
to waive the privilege, in fairness and to avoid abuses.  Similar considera-
tions prevail after the patient’s death. 
Id. at 243–44 (internal citations omitted). 
 68. See id. at 233–34 (not listing a future-crime exception).  The Proposed Rules 
cited an article by the authors of the Connecticut statute: 
It should be noted that our committee deliberately chose not to write a 
‘future crime’ exception into the bill.  Its members were persuaded that, 
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In 1973, the proposed rules were submitted to Congress for ap-
proval.69  However, the proposed rules, particularly Article V, which 
dealt with privileges, got caught up in the political crossfire arising 
out of the Watergate scandal.70  Strong criticism was aimed at the 
“broad scope of the proposed privileges for secrets of state and offi-
cial information.”71  The fact that the proposed rules excluded 
spousal communications from the marital privileges and called for 
the elimination of the physician-patient privilege was also the sub-
ject of frequent attacks.72  Unable to resolve the controversies sur-
rounding these proposed rules, Congress ultimately decided to elim-
inate all of the proposed privileges and to enact a single rule, Rule 
501.73  Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or po-
litical subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles 
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts 
of the United States in light of reason and experience.  How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the 
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
  
as a class, patients willing to express to psychiatrists their intention to 
commit crime are not ordinarily likely to carry out that intention.  Instead, 
they are making a plea for help.  The very making of such pleas affords 
the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work with patients in an attempt 
to resolve their problems.  Such resolutions would be impeded if patients 
were unable to speak freely for fear of possible disclosure at a later date 
in a legal proceeding. 
Goldstein & Katz, supra note 61, at 738–39. 
 69. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the 
Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 512 (1994). 
 70. Id. at 512–14.    
 71. Broun, supra note 47, at 777. 
 72. Id. at 776. 
 73. Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 514. 
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ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law.74  
Following Congress’s decision to enact Rule 501 in lieu of re-
cognizing the specific privileges recommended by the Advisory 
Committee, the federal courts reached differing opinions in deciding 
whether to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege.75  How-
ever, the states did not share in this disagreement; by the time the 
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in Jaffee, statutes in each of 
the fifty states and the District of Columbia had already recognized 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.76   
C.  A Therapist’s Ethical Duty of Confidentiality and the California 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Universi-
ty of California 
In keeping with the long-held belief that confidentiality is essen-
tial to the therapeutic relationship,77 the various mental health pro-
fessions employ a code of ethics that imposes on its members a duty 
  
 74. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 75. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1996). 
 76. Id. at 12 & n.11. 
 77. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 5, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266), 1996 WL 
2017 [hereinafter Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n] (citing 2 HAROLD 
KAPLAN & BENJAMIN SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 
1775–77 (6th ed. 1995)).  The American Psychoanalytic Association has stated 
that analysis cannot proceed without the formation of a rational, trusting therapeu-
tic alliance.  Id.  The threat that a therapist might reveal a patient’s most revealing 
secrets in a court of law would “stand as a permanent obstacle to development of 
the necessary degree of patient trust” and “would pose a significant, and for many 
patients an insurmountable, barrier to effective treatment.”  Id. (citing ROBERT 
LANGS, THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 193 (1973)).  
Similarly, the American Psychological Association has noted that the establish-
ment of trust between the therapist and the patient “has been deemed so essential 
by some that it has been argued that psychotherapy is rendered worthless in its 
absence.”  Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 12, Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 (No. 95-266) (quoting Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce D. 
Sales, Privileged Communications of Psychologists, 13 PROF. PSYCHOL. 372, 372 
(1982)). 
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to protect patients’ confidences.78  Even though the mental health 
profession consistently and zealously advocated for confidentiality 
as the cornerstone of successful treatment, courts and legislators be-
gan to craft exceptions to this ethical duty of confidentiality, which 
required the disclosure of a patient’s confidential communications in 
certain select situations.  In 1976, in the landmark case Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California,79 the California Supreme 
Court first articulated what has come to be known as the “Tarasoff 
  
 78. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Standard 4: Privacy and Confidentiality 
(2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx.  Some relevant 
subsections of the American Psychological Association’s Code of Conduct are: 
4.01 Maintaining Confidentiality 
Psychologists have a primary obligation and take reasonable precau-
tions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in any 
medium, recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be 
regulated by law or established by institutional rules or professional or 
scientific relationship. 
4.02  Discussing the Limits of Confidentiality 
(a) Psychologists discuss with persons (including, to the extent feasi-
ble, persons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent and 
their legal representatives) and organizations with whom they establish a 
scientific or professional relationship (1) the relevant limits of confiden-
tiality and (2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through 
their psychological activities.  
(b) Unless it is not feasible or is contraindicated, the discussion of 
confidentiality occurs at the outset of the relationship and thereafter as 
new circumstances may warrant. 
. . . . 
4.05  Disclosures 
(a) Psychologists may disclose confidential information with the ap-
propriate consent of the organizational client, the individual client/patient, 
or another legally authorized person on behalf of the client/patient unless 
prohibited by law. 
(b) Psychologists disclose confidential information without the con-
sent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where permitted by 
law for a valid purpose such as to (1) provide needed professional servic-
es; (2) obtain appropriate professional consultations; (3) protect the 
client/patient, psychologist, or others from harm; or (4) obtain payment 
for services from a client/patient, in which instance disclosure is limited 
to the minimum that is necessary to achieve the purpose. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 79. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
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duty,” which imposes a duty on therapists to protect third parties 
from harm caused by their patients.80  In Tarasoff, Prosenjit Poddar, 
a patient of Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed by the 
University of California at Berkley, killed Tatiana Tarasoff on Octo-
ber 27, 1969.81  Two months prior to the murder, Poddar had con-
fided to Moore his intention to kill Tarasoff.82  Dr. Moore imme-
diately contacted the campus police, who briefly detained Poddar but 
subsequently released him.83  Neither the campus police nor Dr. 
Moore took further action.84   
The California Supreme Court held, “[w]hen a therapist deter-
mines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should deter-
mine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to anoth-
er, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the in-
tended victim against such danger.”85  The court stated that this duty 
could be accomplished in a variety of ways, including: warning the 
“intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger,” 
notifying the police, or taking “whatever other steps are reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances.”86  Regarding Poddar and his 
therapist, the court found that a “special relationship” existed be-
tween them, which gave rise to a duty on the part of the therapist to 
use reasonable care to protect a threatened individual from danger 
emanating from a patient’s mental illness.87  Concerns were raised in 
amicus briefs filed by the American Psychiatric Association and oth-
er mental health societies that this duty would be unworkable be-
cause therapists cannot accurately predict when, or if, a patient will 
  
 80. Id. at 343–47. 
 81. Id. at 339.  The facts stated are as alleged by Tarasoff’s parents.  Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 339–40. 
 84. Id. at 340. 
 85. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 344.  The court likened the therapist-patient relationship and the inter-
connected duty to third persons to situations in which a doctor was found to have a 
duty to warn family members of a patient’s contagious disease and other cases 
where courts have found physicians liable to third parties for the doctor’s negli-
gent failure to diagnose a contagious disease.  Id. 
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become violent.88  Although the court acknowledged the difficulty a 
therapist would have in correctly forecasting a patient’s behavior, it 
responded that a therapist “need only exercise ‘that reasonable de-
gree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised 
by members of (that professional specialty) under similar circums-
tances.’”89 
The Tarasoff decision prompted a swell of similar judicial deci-
sions and statutory enactments throughout the states, such that, by 
the time that Jaffee reached the U.S. Supreme Court, a majority of 
states had followed Tarasoff in one form or another.90  It is with this 
backdrop that the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in 
Jaffee.  
D.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege: Jaffee v. Redmond 
   
In Jaffee, seven members of the Supreme Court found that the 
communications between a patient and her therapist were protected 
from disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege.91  The case 
involved Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer for the Village of 
Hoffman Estates, Illinois, who shot and killed a young man while on 
patrol duty.92  Following this incident, she received extensive thera-
py from a licensed clinical social worker.93  Carrie Jaffee, the admin-
istrator of the decedent’s estate, filed a civil rights action in federal 
court against Redmond and the Village of Hoffman Estates, alleging 
that the respondents had violated the decedent’s constitutional rights 
by the use of excessive force.94 
  
 88. See Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n as Amici Curiae, Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 
334 (S.F. No. 23042). 
 89. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (quoting Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484 
(Cal. 1970) and Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161, 172 (Cal. 1965)).   
 90. George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege: The “Tarasoff Duty” and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. 
REV. 33, 47 (1999). 
 91. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). 
 92. Id. at 4. 
 93. Id. at 3–5.    
 94. Id. at 5. 
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During the pretrial discovery phase of the litigation, the petition-
ers sought access to the social worker’s notes of her sessions with 
Redmond.95  The respondents objected to the request on the ground 
that the information was protected by the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.96  Although the district court rejected that argument, nei-
ther Redmond nor her therapist complied with the order to disclose 
the contents of the notes.97  At the close of the trial, the judge in-
structed the jury that the refusal to turn over the notes had no “legal 
justification” and, therefore, the jury could presume that the contents 
would have been detrimental to the defendants.98  The jury awarded 
the petitioners $545,000 in damages.99  The Seventh Circuit, recog-
nizing the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, re-
versed and remanded the case.100  The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to decide whether “it is appropriate for federal courts to recog-
nize a ‘psychotherapist privilege’ under Rule 501 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”101 
The opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, begins by noting that 
Rule 501 allows federal courts to recognize new privileges by inter-
preting “common law principles . . . in the light of reason and expe-
rience,” and that it directs the federal courts to “continue the evolu-
tionary development of testimonial privileges.”102  However, the 
Court recognized the general principle limiting the recognition of 
privileges, stating:  
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a 
fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every 
man’s evidence.  When we come to examine the various 
claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption 
that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is ca-
pable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are 
  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5. 
 98. Id. at 5–6. 
 99. Id. at 6.   
100. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1358 (7th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 1 
(1996). 
101. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 4. 
102. Id. at 2.   
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distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a pos-
itive general rule.103 
The Court explained that exceptions from the general rule disfa-
voring testimonial privileges may be justified by a public good.104  
Applying the utilitarian approach, the Court noted that deciding 
whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege was justified required 
that it determine whether the protection of confidential communica-
tions between a patient and her therapist advances considerably im-
portant interests, which outweigh the need for relevant evidence.105  
The Court found that the psychotherapist-patient privilege does 
advance important private and public interests.106  It also found that 
private interests are served when the communications between a pa-
tient and her therapist are protected from involuntary disclosure be-
cause effective psychotherapy demands “an atmosphere of confi-
dence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and 
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.”107  As 
the Court explained, the “mere possibility” of disclosure of confiden-
tial communications could obstruct the development of the confiden-
tial relationship required for treatment to be successful.108  Thus, the 
Court concluded that “[w]here there may be exceptions to this gen-
eral rule . . ., there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine 
qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.”109  The Court also 
found that the protection of confidential communications between 
patients and therapists serves important public interests because it 
facilitates the provision of mental health services.110  It remarked: 
“The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, 
is a public good of transcendent importance.”111  
  
103. Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 9–10. 
106. Id. at 10.   
107. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.    
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 10 (citing Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) (Advisory Committee’s Notes)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
110. Id. at 11.    
111. Id.  
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Continuing its analysis, the Court weighed the public and private 
interests served by the privilege against the value of the evidence 
expected to be produced in the absence of a privilege.112  The Court 
suggested that little valuable evidence would be produced in the ab-
sence of a privilege because patients would be hesitant to disclose 
confidential information.113  It noted: 
If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations be-
tween psychotherapists and their patients would surely be 
chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances 
that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in 
litigation.  Without a privilege, much of the desirable evi-
dence to which litigants such as petitioner seek access—for 
example, admissions against interest by a party—is unlikely 
to come into being.  This unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore 
serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been 
spoken and privileged.114 
In interpreting the “reason and experience” language of Rule 
501, the Court explained that recognition of the privilege by all of 
the states indicated that “reason and experience” support recognition 
of the privilege in the federal courts.115  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court also relied on the fact that the psychotherapist-patient pri-
vilege was included among the nine privileges recommended in the 
Advisory Committee’s proposed rules.116   
The Court rejected the balancing test adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit in which the court balanced the evidentiary need for the in-
formation against the privacy interests at stake.117  The Court noted:  
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial 
judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the pa-
tient’s interests in privacy and the evidentiary need for dis-
closure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privi-
lege . . . .  An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be 
  
112. Id. at 11–12.   
113. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11–12.  
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 12–13. 
116. Id. at 14. 
117. Id. at 17. 
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certain but results in widely varying applications by the 
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.118 
Finally, although the Court refused to identify exceptions to the 
privilege, as that issue was not implicated by the case, Justice Ste-
vens hinted that the privilege might not apply in certain situations.119  
He stated in footnote 19:  
Although it would be premature to speculate about most fu-
ture developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, 
we do not doubt that there are situations in which the privi-
lege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm 
to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a 
disclosure by the therapist.120 
Less than two years after this decision, the Tenth Circuit was 
called upon to delineate the contours of this privilege and to interpret 
the import of this particular footnote.121 
  
118. Id. at 17–18 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
119. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18. 
120. Id. at 18 n.19.  Justice Scalia dissented and was joined in part by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.  See id. at 18–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He criticized the majority for 
ignoring the “traditional judicial preference for the truth” and for “creating a privi-
lege that is new, vast, and ill defined.”  Id. at 19–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He 
questioned whether the privilege truly serves personal interests and whether there 
is a public benefit resulting from the privilege.  Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
He asked: 
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist came to play such 
an indispensable role in the maintenance of the citizenry’s mental health?  
For most of history, men and women have worked out their difficulties by 
talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends and bartenders—none 
of whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in court.  Ask the av-
erage citizen: Would your mental health be more significantly impaired 
by preventing you from seeing a psychotherapist, or by preventing you 
from getting advice from your mom?  I have little doubt what the answer 
would be.  Yet there is no mother-child privilege.  
Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
121. See United States. v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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IV. THE DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION TO THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
COURT DECISIONS 
A.  The Tenth Circuit: United States v. Glass      
With United States v. Glass, the Tenth Circuit became the first 
federal circuit court after Jaffee to examine whether federal courts 
should recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherap-
ist-patient privilege.122  Glass involved a defendant, Archie Monroe 
Glass, who was voluntarily admitted to the mental health unit at 
Hillcrest Hospital in February 1996.123  During his stay, he told his 
psychotherapist, Dr. Shantharam Darbe, that he “wanted to get in the 
history books like Hinkley [sic] and wanted to shoot Bill Clinton and 
Hilary [sic].”124  He was subsequently released from the hospital 
after agreeing to participate in outpatient therapy and reside with his 
father.125  However, ten days after his release, a nurse discovered 
that he had left his father’s home.126  She contacted local law en-
forcement, which, in turn, contacted Secret Service agents.127  These 
agents interviewed Dr. Darbe, who reported Glass’s statements.128  
Glass was charged with knowingly and willfully threatening to kill 
the President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).129    
Glass moved to exclude Dr. Darbe’s statement on the ground that 
it was protected from disclosure by the psychotherapist-patient  pri-
  
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1357. 
124. Id.   
125. Id.  
126. Id.   
127. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357.   
128. Id. at 1357.   
129. Id.  18 U.S.C. § 871(a) provides in relevant part: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the 
mail or for delivery . . . any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to in-
flict bodily harm upon the President of the United States . . . or knowing-
ly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President . . . 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2006). 
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vilege as set forth in Jaffee.130  The government argued that the 
statement was not protected by the privilege because it fell within 
the exception Justice Stevens set forth in footnote 19 of the Jaffee 
opinion—where “a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others 
can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.”131 
The court of appeals agreed with this argument by the govern-
ment.  It found that footnote 19 did, in fact, suggest a dangerous-
patient exception and identified the necessary criteria.132  However, 
the court found that, based on the sparse record in the court below, 
the evidence failed to demonstrate that the required criteria were 
established.133  It remanded the case to the district court for factual 
findings and a determination of whether Glass’s threat “was serious 
when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of 
averting harm to the President when the disclosure was made.”134 
B.  The Sixth Circuit:  United States v. Hayes  
In 2000, the Sixth Circuit was confronted with the same issue as 
the Glass court in United States v. Hayes.135  In Hayes, the defen-
dant, Roy Lee Hayes, an employee of the U.S. Postal Service, was 
charged with threatening to murder a federal official in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §115,136 as a result of disclosures he made during a thera-
py session.137  On February 9, 1998, Hayes sought treatment at the 
Veterans Administration Mountain Home Hospital in Johnson City, 
  
130. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357.   
131. Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)). 
132. Id. at 1359–60. 
133. Id. at 1359.   
134. Id. at 1360.  There is no published record of the proceedings of the district 
court on remand.  
135. 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000). 
136. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) provides in part: 
Whoever . . . threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States 
official . . . with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such offi-
cial . . . while engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent 
to retaliate against such official . . . on account of the performance of 
official duties, shall be punished. 
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006). 
137. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 579–80. 
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Tennessee.138  At his first therapy session with Dr. Dianne Hansen, 
he expressed his desire to kill his supervisor, Veda Odle.139  He was 
released from the hospital several days later but was hospitalized 
again in late February, during which time he repeated his desire to 
kill Odle.140   
On March 10, 1998, Hayes went to the Veterans Center in John-
son City, where he met with James Edward Van Dyke, a social 
worker at the center.141  During this session, Hayes again revealed 
his desire to kill Odle.142  Van Dyke claimed that he advised Hayes 
that he had a duty to warn Odle if he believed that Hayes posed a 
serious threat to her.143  Van Dyke allowed Hayes to leave on the 
condition that he return for a therapy session on March 31.144  Dur-
ing his follow-up session on March 31, Hayes “outlined in great de-
tail” his plan to murder Odle.145  Although Van Dyke once again 
allowed Hayes to leave, he reported these threats to Odle.146  When 
Odle learned of Hayes’s threats, she immediately contacted the Post-
al Inspector, who filed a criminal complaint against Hayes.147 
After a grand jury issued an indictment against him, Hayes 
moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress the production of his 
therapist’s records and to exclude Van Dyke from testifying on the 
ground that the evidence was privileged.148  The district court or-
dered the suppression of Van Dyke’s testimony and Hayes’s medical 
records and, soon thereafter, dismissed the case against him.149  The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed.150  
The Sixth Circuit began its discussion by distinguishing the state 
law Tarasoff duty-to-warn requirement from the psychotherapist-
  





143. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 580.   
146. Id.   
147. Id. at 580–81.   
148. Id. at 581.   
149. Hayes, 277 F.3d at 581.   
150. Id. at 587.   
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patient privilege.151  It noted the lack of connection between a the-
rapist’s duty to notify a third person of a patient’s threat to harm him 
and the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which serves to prohibit a 
therapist from testifying about the threat in a subsequent prosecution 
of the patient.152  The court explained that the “Tarasoff duty” serves 
a more immediate function than the dangerous-patient exception and 
further explained that the likelihood of the threat being carried out 
greatly diminishes once court proceedings have begun.153  The court 
commented on the paradox involved in cases like Hayes’s: Although 
Hayes should be applauded for seeking therapy for his psychotic 
delusions, he, instead, would become subject to criminal prosecution 
when his therapists are required to testify against him.154  
The court went on to examine the effect that a dangerous-patient 
exception would have on the therapeutic relationship.155  It noted 
that although warning a patient about a therapist’s duty to protect an 
intended victim could have a “marginal effect” on a patient’s open-
ness in therapy, warning a patient that his statements could be used 
against him in criminal proceedings would “certainly chill and very 
likely terminate open dialogue.”156  The court also opined that a the-
rapist’s testimony in a criminal proceeding, which is used to convict 
and incarcerate a patient, fails to serve the public’s interest in pro-
tecting third parties from threats posed by patients because incarce-
ration diminishes the likelihood that a patient’s mental health will 
improve.157    
In addressing the questions raised by footnote 19 of the Jaffee 
opinion, the Sixth Circuit found that Justice Stevens meant to assure 
that the privilege would not operate to impede a therapist’s com-
pliance with the duty to protect third persons from harm.158  The 
court also found that Justice Stevens intended to recognize the need 
  
151. Id. at 583.   
152. Id. at 583–84.   
153. Id. at 584.   
154. Id. 
155. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85. 
156. Id. at 585 (citing Gregory B. Leong et al., The Psychotherapist as Witness for 
the Prosecution: The Criminalization of Tarasoff, 8 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1011, 
1014 (1992)). 
157. Id.  
158. Id.  
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for therapists to testify in certain court proceedings, such as those for 
involuntary commitment of a patient, as part of their duty to protect 
the patient or identifiable third persons.159 
Finally, the court noted that the majority of states did not have a 
dangerous-patient exception as part of their evidence jurisprudence 
and that only California had a dangerous-patient exception contained 
within its evidence code.160  The court also relied on the fact that the 
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence did not provide for a dangerous-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in reaching 
its conclusion that “reason and experience” demonstrated that the 
exception should not be part of the federal common law.161  It stated: 
We hold, therefore, that the federal psychotherap-
ist/patient privilege does not impede a psychotherapist’s 
compliance with his professional and ethical duty to protect 
innocent third parties, a duty which may require, among oth-
er things, disclosure to third parties or testimony at an invo-
luntary hospitalization proceeding.  Conversely, compliance 
with the professional duty to protect does not imply a duty to 
testify against a patient in criminal proceedings or in civil 
proceedings other than directly related to the patient’s invo-
luntary hospitalization, and such testimony is privileged and 




160. Id. at 585–86. 
161. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586. 
162. Id.  In addition to arguing for a dangerous-patient exception, the government 
made an alternative argument that Hayes’s continued threats, which were made 
after Van Dyke informed him that he would need to disclose the threats to law 
enforcement, constituted a waiver of the testimonial privilege.  Id.  The majority, 
however, was unconvinced.  Id.  It noted: “It is one thing to inform a patient of the 
‘duty to protect’; it is quite another to advise a patient that his ‘trusted’ confidant 
may one day assist in procuring his conviction and incarceration.”  Id.  The court 
found that since none of Hayes’s therapists had advised him that they might testify 
against him, he could not have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the privi-
lege.  Id.  The court explained that for a valid waiver to occur, “a psychotherapist 
must provide that patient with an explanation of the consequences of that waiver 
suited to the unique needs of that patient.”  Id. at 587.  
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C.  The Ninth Circuit:  United States v. Chase 
The Ninth Circuit was the third circuit court to address the dan-
gerous-patient-exception issue.  In United States v. Chase,163 defen-
dant Steven Chase was charged with two counts of threatening fed-
eral law enforcement officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 115(a)(1)(B).164  These threats were communicated to Dr. Kay Di-
eter on several occasions despite the fact that Dieter repeatedly 
warned Chase that she had a duty to warn the intended victims of 
these threats.165  Chase repeated these threats to two telephone op-
erators at Dieter’s clinic.166  Dr. Dieter testified at trial, recounting 
the therapy sessions in which Chase had threatened the federal 
agents.167  The district court held that the testimony was admissi-
ble.168  It applied the test set forth in Glass and found that the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege did not apply.169  On appeal, the Ninth 
  
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boggs argued that any barriers to testifying 
against a patient are eliminated once a therapist informs a patient that their conver-
sations will not be kept confidential.  Id. at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting).  Boggs also 
found that Hayes had waived any privilege when he continued to threaten Odle 
after he had been informed that his threats would be reported, stating: “I object to 
creating a barrier that prevents competent testimony as to the commission of a 
crime by a fully warned patient from coming into court.”  Id. at 589 (Boggs, J., 
dissenting). 
163. 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).  
164. Id. at 979. 
165. Id.  
166. Id. at 980.  
167. Id. at 981.  
168. Id.  
169. Chase, 340 F.3d at 981; see United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 
1998).  The district court held that the dangerous-patient exception applied be-
cause “Dr. Dieter had determined that Defendant’s threats were serious when ut-
tered, that harm was imminent, and that the disclosure to authorities was the only 
means of averting the threatened harm.”  Chase, 340 F.3d at 981.  The jury con-
victed Chase of the charges in connection with the threats made to the telephone 
operators, but it acquitted him of the charges relating to the threats he made during 
his therapy sessions.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision be-
cause it found that the admission of Dieter’s testimony was harmless error since 
the jury had acquitted Chase of the charges associated with those particular threats.  
Id. at 993.  
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Circuit found that the district court erred in recognizing the danger-
ous-patient exception and in admitting Dieter’s testimony.170 
The Ninth Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege and the dangerous-patient exception to 
it.171  The court first found that even though Chase’s threats them-
selves constituted a crime, the statements remained confidential un-
der Oregon law.172  It noted: “Once Defendant finished uttering the 
threats, the charged crime was completed, and the psychiatrist was in 
the same position she would have occupied had her patient described 
a bank robbery in which he had participated a week earlier.”173   
Next, the court discussed the Jaffee and Hayes decisions in 
depth.174  Like the Hayes court, the Ninth Circuit drew a clear dis-
tinction between a therapist’s ethical duty of confidentiality and the 
testimonial privilege.175  It noted: “[A] state-law breach of psycho-
therapist-patient confidentiality would not necessarily lead to an ab-
rogation of the federal testimonial privilege.”176  In a similar vein, 
the court interpreted Jaffee’s footnote 19 to be the Supreme Court’s 
indirect endorsement of a therapist’s duty to disclose threats to in-
tended victims and the authorities.177   
The court provided four reasons in support of its refusal to rec-
ognize a dangerous-patient exception.178  First, it found that crafting 
a federal exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege would 
undermine the confidentiality laws of the states located in the Ninth 
Circuit because California was the only one of them to have recog-
nized an evidentiary dangerous-patient exception.179   
Second, the Court found little connection between a therapist’s 
“Tarasoff duty” to report serious threats and the testimonial privi-
lege, noting: “There is not necessarily a connection between the 
  
170. Chase, 340 F.3d at 992–93. 
171. Id. at 982–92. 
172. Id. at 982. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 983–85. 
175. Id. at 984–85. 
176. Chase, 340 F.3d at 985 (emphases in original).   
177. Id. at 984.   
178. Id. at 985–92.   
179. Id. at 985–86.   
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goals of protection and proof.”180  Furthermore, the Court counseled 
against conditioning a federal testimonial privilege on any state re-
porting laws because doing so would result in similarly situated pa-
tients facing different rules of evidence in the federal courts because 
of the variations among the state reporting laws.181  
Third, the court cited the fact that Proposed Rule of Evidence 
504 did not include a dangerous-patient exception.182  The court 
noted that because the Supreme Court recognized the privilege and 
favorably cited to Proposed Rule 504, “the contents of the [Proposed 
Rule] have considerable force and should be consulted when the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is invoked.”183 
Finally, the Court addressed the public policy reasons supporting 
the privilege and those in support of the exception.184  It concluded 
that the benefits derived from refusing to recognize the exception far 
outweighed any evidentiary gain resulting from the compelled testi-
mony.185  It noted the “deleterious effect” that abrogation of the pri-
vilege would have on the therapeutic relationship and, in doing so, 
quoted the Hayes court: “[I]f our Nation’s mental health is indeed as 
valuable as the Supreme Court has indicated, and we think it is, the 
chilling effect that would result from the recognition of a ‘dangerous 
patient’ exception and its logical consequences is the first reason to 
reject it.”186  
  
180. Id. at 987. 
181. Id. at 987–88. 
182. Chase, 340 F.3d at 989. 
183. Id. at 990 (quoting 3 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 504.02, at 504–07 
1997) (footnote omitted)). 
184. Id. at 990–92. 
185. Id. at 990. 
186. Id. at 990–91 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 584–85) 
(2000)).  In a concurring opinion, Judge Kleinfeld expressed that this case was 
precisely the type of case described in footnote 19 of the Jaffee opinion, and there-
fore, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not apply.  Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, 
J., concurring).  He reminded the majority that Jaffee involved only testimonial 
privileges, not a therapist’s duty of confidentiality and further explained that be-
cause the issue of the “Tarasoff duty” to warn is a question of state tort law, it is 
beyond the scope of Jaffee.  Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  Judge Kleinfeld 
also reminded the majority of the plain language of footnote 19, which states, “the 
privilege must give way.”  Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (citing Jaffee v. 
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).  He stated: “There is just no getting around 
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D.   The Fifth Circuit:  United States v. Auster 
The Fifth Circuit was confronted with the question of whether 
the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege should be adopted in United States v. Auster.187  However, the 
court did not decide the issue, but, rather, found that the privilege 
itself did not exist because the defendant had no reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality.188 
In Auster, defendant John Auster had, over the course of several 
years, made numerous threats against certain individuals during 
therapy sessions.189  His therapists had repeatedly informed him that 
his threats would be reported.190  More importantly, his therapists 
routinely reported these threats to his potential victims, and Auster 
was aware that his potential victims were warned of his threats.191  
The court found that Auster did not have a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality with respect to these threats and, on that basis, con-
cluded that the threats were not privileged communications.192  Thus, 
  
the proposition that Jaffee said, and meant, that the psychotherapist-patient ‘privi-
lege must give way,’ referring to the privilege under Rule 501 to refuse to testify.”  
Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 at 18 n.19). 
Judge Kleinfeld also expressed that a patient clearly waives the privilege 
when he continues to communicate threats after being warned by the therapist that 
his threats will be disclosed.  Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  He also disa-
greed with the majority’s evaluation of the harm to the therapeutic relationship as 
the result of a therapist’s disclosure.  Id. at 997 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  Rather, 
he found that the real damage to the relationship occurs at the point where the 
therapist initially betrays the patient’s confidences.  Id. (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  
Furthermore, in cases where disclosure of a patient’s threats is necessary, he ex-
pressed that: 
[T]he social interest in assuring that the judge and jury know the whole 
truth greatly exceeds the value of preserving any remaining shreds of the 
confidential therapeutic relationship.  The jury ought, in such circums-
tances, to know the truth about what Chase said.  The cat being already 
out of the bag, trial is no occasion for stuffing it back in. 
Id. at 998 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
187. 517 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2008).  
188. Id. at 315.  
189. Id. at 313.  
190. Id.  
191. Id.  
192. Id. at 315–16.  
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the court was able to resolve this case on these grounds and avoid 
reaching a decision as to whether or not a dangerous-patient excep-
tion should be recognized.193  
  
193. Auster, 517 F.3d at 321.  Auster was a retired New Orleans police officer 
who was receiving workers’ compensation benefits.  Id. at 313.  Drs. Fred Davis 
and Harold Ginzburg were treating him for paranoia, anger, and depression.  Id.  
He was in treatment for several years and threatened numerous people during his 
therapy sessions.  Id.   
The Fifth Circuit held that Auster’s communications to his therapists were not 
privileged because Auster had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality, as his 
therapists had repeatedly informed him that his threats would be communicated to 
his targeted victims, and he was aware of numerous instances where these threats 
were in fact reported to the potential victims.  Id. at 315.  The Fifth Circuit was 
correct to reach this decision given the unusual facts of this case. 
However, the Fifth Circuit did not stop there.  It went on to perform a balanc-
ing test, finding that the “cost-benefit scales favor disclosure” in situations where a 
patient has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality.  Id. at 319.  It also con-
cluded that the benefit to therapy from protecting these communications from 
disclosure at trial, while allowing the therapist to warn the threatened individuals, 
is de minimus because the “atmosphere of confidence and trust” is severely un-
dermined once the disclosure is made.  Id. at 318.  Conversely, the court found that 
the increase in the admissibility of this type of probative evidence at trial serves 
the public interest because of the important interests in the proper administration 
of criminal trials.  Id. at 318–19. 
Although the court was correct to conclude that a confidential communication 
is one that is not intended for disclosure to third persons, disclosure of confidential 
communications does not, in and of itself, waive the privilege.  MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §5.6, at 352–54 (3d ed. 2003).  The Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to Proposed Rule of Evidence 512 suggest that a waiver of a privi-
lege does not occur where a disclosure is made before the holder has a chance to 
claim the privilege.  Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972).  Additionally, many courts have found that if disclo-
sure results from a breach of an ethical duty of confidentiality, the holder of the 
privilege can nonetheless prevent the subsequent use in legal proceedings.  See, 
e.g., United States. v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 804–05 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing the 
assertion of a privilege where evidence was improperly divulged by an attorney); 
In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D. Ohio 1984) 
(upholding a privilege even though the privileged information had been published 
in a newspaper); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 112 (Okla. 1988) (privilege 
can be asserted to block the testimony of a doctor at trial even though the informa-
tion was disclosed by the doctor to the police and used as the basis for an arrest). 
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V. THE CHASE AND HAYES CASES WERE CORRECTLY DECIDED  
A.   Footnote 19 and the Legislative History of Proposed Rule 504 
1.  Jaffee’s Footnote 19  
The much-discussed footnote 19 in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jaffee provides:  
Although it would be premature to speculate about most fu-
ture developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege, 
we do not doubt that there are situations in which the privi-
lege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm 
to the patient or others can be averted only by means of a 
disclosure by the therapist.194   
The courts that have dealt with this footnote have not only disagreed 
over its meaning195 but have also disagreed as to the persuasive val-
ue that should be afforded to this dicta.196    
  
194. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996). 
195. In Auster, the Fifth Circuit noted that Jaffee’s footnote 19 “demonstrates that 
the Court viewed the privilege as limited in scope.”  Auster, 517 F.3d at 315 n.5.  
Conversely, Judge Boggs, in his dissenting opinion in Hayes, stated: “[F]ootnote 
19 in Jaffee at least indicated that the Supreme Court did not mean that the rule it 
had laid down was absolute, with no opening for further consideration in light of 
other circumstances.”  United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 588 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(Boggs, J., dissenting).  
196. Dictum has been defined as a “court’s stating of a legal principle more 
broadly than is necessary to decide the case” or a “court’s discussion of points or 
questions not raised by the record or its suggestion of rules not applicable in the 
case at bar.”  Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate 
Non-Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 90 (2008) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 485 (8th ed. 2004)).  Obiter dictum, translated as a remark by the 
way, has been defined as a “judicial comment made while delivering a judicial 
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential.”  Id. at 90–91 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 
2004)).  Footnote 19 is clearly dictum: It suggests a rule that was not necessary to 
the decision and, furthermore, identifies a situation (when a patient’s threats 
present a serious threat of harm to others) that was not present in the case before 
the Court.  Jaffee was a § 1983 action in which the petitioners sought damages for 
wrongful death resulting from a shooting incident involving Officer Redmond, and 
the petitioners sought to compel the production of Redmond’s therapist’s notes 
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The legal community has struggled to formulate a workable de-
finition of dicta and to fashion a consistent approach to determining 
the appropriate level of authority it should be afforded.197  Legal 
theorists have long engaged in the dictum-holding debate.198  Early 
commentators such as Karl Llewellyn advocated for a formalistic 
approach to differentiating dicta from case holdings.199  Professor 
Llewellyn proposed four rules that he believed form the foundation 
of American case law procedure:   
1.  The court must decide the legal dispute that is before 
it. 
2.  The court can decide nothing but the legal dispute be-
fore it. 
3.  All cases must be decided based on a rule of law of 
general applicability (in the relevant state). 
4.  Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to be 
read and understood only in relation to the actual case before 
the court.200 
Accordingly, Professor Llewellyn believed that the holding of a case 
must be a narrow proposition and anything that is not part of the 
holding is dicta.201 
  
from their therapy sessions following the incident.  See supra notes 91–94 and 
accompanying text. 
197. See generally Taylor, supra note 196, at 77. 
198. See id. at 97–100. 
199. Id. at 97 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14–
15 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989)). 
200. Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 199, at 14–15). 
201. LLEWELLYN, supra note 199, at 14.  If dicta has no precedential value, then 
why do judges include it in opinions?  Some theorize that statements a judge 
makes while fully aware that they have no precedential value are made with some 
hope that they will be persuasive.  See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 
U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2027 n.109 (1994) (“A lower court is . . . always free to treat 
a higher court’s dicta as persuasive authority.”).  These types of statements have 
been said to be the classic forms of dicta.  Id. at 2000.  For an example of this type 
of dicta, see Justice Scalia’s remarks in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 
622–48 (1991).  Others have speculated as to why the Supreme Court would in-
clude dicta in its opinions.  One commentator has suggested that the Court might 
want to indicate how it would likely resolve a particular question in the future and, 
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Contemporary dicta doctrine is unsettled and far from clear.  
Courts have not settled on a cohesive means of determining the per-
suasive value of dicta;202 judicial opinions vary widely with some 
courts going so far as to treat some dicta as binding authority.203  
However, the value that courts have assigned to dicta does appear to 
be directly related to the depth of discussion and analysis the dicta 
initially received.204  Professor Lisa Durham Taylor has described 
the various gradations of dicta as a spectrum “with the left end com-
prised of the court’s offhand remarks and side comments, referred to 
by some as obiter dicta, and the right end occupied by the court’s 
reasoned conclusions about the law, often labeled judicial dicta or 
considered dicta.”205  The First Circuit has noted: “[I]n evaluating 
dicta, ‘[m]uch depends on the character of the dictum.  Mere obiter 
may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered state-
ment . . ., though technically dictum, must carry great weight, and 
may even . . . be regarded as conclusive.”206  The Supreme Court 
appears to agree.  It has noted that considered dicta, contrasted with 
obiter dicta, has “capacity, though it be less than a decision, to tilt 
the balanced mind toward submission and agreement.”207  Addition-
ally, it has been said that obiter dicta or “passing statements unsup-
ported by any authority or even extended discussion are entitled to 
  
since the Court is only able to decide a small fraction of the cases brought before 
it, providing the lower courts with this information can guide them in reaching the 
decision that the Court itself might reach.  Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by 
Implication, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV 151, 173–74 (2009). 
202. See Taylor, supra note 196, at 106–07. 
203. See id. at 107. 
204. See id. at 106–07. 
205. Id. at 93–94 (footnotes omitted).  
206. Id. at 93 n.79 (citing McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 
1991) (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (4th ed. 
1983)). 
207. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 59 (1933).  Justice Souter has commented:  
“Sound judicial decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vi-
gorous defense’ of the issues in dispute, and a . . . rule announced sua sponte is 
entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.”  
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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nothing but disregard.”208  One scholar has gone so far as to suggest 
that these types of deliberate asides may violate the case or contro-
versy requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which pro-
hibits federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.209 
This confusion surrounding the proper treatment of dicta is illu-
strated in the federal courts’ opinions that have addressed footnote 
19 of the Jaffee opinion.  The Tenth Circuit, in Glass, treated this 
dicta as decisive when it crafted a dangerous-patient exception to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege based solely upon the language 
contained within the footnote, without ever addressing the question 
of dicta.210  Judge Kleinfeld, concurring in Chase, opined that the 
Supreme Court spoke to the issue of the dangerous-patient exception 
in footnote 19 and, based on this interpretation, concluded that the 
dangerous-patient exception was applicable.211  In doing so, he 
noted:  
We ordinarily treat Supreme Court dicta with ‘due deference’ 
even though they are not binding.  Because we are to interp-
ret those decisions ‘in the light of reason and experience,’ the 
Supreme Court’s dictum should speak even more persuasive-
ly than usual, since, dictum or not, what the Court says re-
flects its ‘reason and experience.’212 
  
208. Shannon, supra note 201, at 174.  
209. Dorf, supra note 201, at 2006, 2009. 
210. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).  The Tenth 
Circuit held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would not apply to threats 
that are “serious when . . . uttered and  . . . disclosure [is] the only means of avert-
ing harm.”  Id. at 1360. 
211. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., 
concurring). 
212. Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 
450, 453 (9th Cir. 1996).  Referencing footnote 19, Judge Kleinfield concluded 
that the “privilege of a psychotherapist to refuse to testify in federal court, or her 
patient’s privilege to bar her testimony, does not exist ‘if a serious threat of harm 
to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the the-
rapist.’  That is, when the serious threat occurred that could be averted only by 
disclosure, the privilege died.”  Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting Jaf-
fee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).  However, it is interesting that in 
another part of the opinion he remarks that the footnote “has the look of a footnote 
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More recently, the District of Maine, in adopting the Glass test, con-
cluded that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale was “persuasive . . . particu-
larly given the Supreme Court’s footnote in Jaffee suggesting that 
the privilege must give way to a serious threat of harm.”213   
It is clear that the courts that have relied upon this footnote in 
reaching their decisions, particularly the Tenth Circuit, which crafted 
a dangerous-patient exception based entirely on this footnote, have 
erred.  They have assigned a significant level of persuasive value to 
this footnote, which is nothing more than an offhand remark or side 
comment.  This footnote is wholly unsupported by any authority and 
void of any reasoned analysis or conclusions about the law.214  As 
such, it is the classic form of obiter dicta, and courts interpreting the 
Jaffee opinion should give it little weight or, better still, simply dis-
regard these comments. 
2.  The Legislative History of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 
504 
In addition to the disagreement surrounding the persuasive value 
of footnote 19, the federal circuit courts have also disagreed as to the 
meaning of the footnote.  The Tenth Circuit, in Glass, along with the 
dissenting judges in Hayes and Judge Kleinfeld, concurring in 
Chase, believed that the Supreme Court suggested it would be ap-
propriate to recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege in situations where a serious threat of 
harm can only be prevented by a therapist’s disclosure.215  Converse-
ly, the Hayes majority understood the footnote to recognize the need 
for therapists to testify in certain court proceedings, such as those for 
involuntary commitment proceedings, and found that Justice Stevens 
meant to assure that the privilege would not impede upon a therap-
ist’s compliance with the “Tarasoff duty.”216  Likewise, the Chase 
  
added to avert a risk that someone in the majority perceived were the opinion pub-
lished without it.”  Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J, concurring). 
213. United States v. Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D. Me. 2009).   
214. This issue was neither addressed in the parties’ briefs nor was raised during 
oral argument.   
215. Chase, 340 F.3d at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); United States v. Hayes, 
227 F.3d 578, 588 (6th Cir. 2000) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.   
216. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585–86.   
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majority interpreted Jaffee’s footnote 19 to be the Supreme Court’s 
indirect endorsement of a therapist’s duty to disclose threats to in-
tended victims and found that the Court intended to extend the state 
“Tarasoff duty” to psychotherapist-patient relationships to which 
federal law would apply, such as psychological treatment by federal-
ly employed therapists at oversees government hospitals.217 
In a strong concurring opinion in Chase, Judge Kleinfeld criti-
cized the majority for its position.218  He chastised the majority for 
ignoring the Court’s use of the word privilege, stating: 
The words ‘the privilege must give way’ [within the foot-
note] do not mean that the right to out-of-court confidentiali-
ty must give way . . . . There is only one way to read the plain 
English of the Jaffee footnote, and that is that the privilege of 
a psychotherapist to refuse to testify in federal court, or her 
patient’s privilege to bar her testimony, does not exist ‘if a 
serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be 
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.’219 
However, Judge Kleinfeld’s conclusion is flawed.  The footnote is 
not unambiguous, as he suggests, because there is inconsistency 
within the language of the footnote itself.  Although the Court used 
the word “privilege” (“we do not doubt that there are situations in 
which the privilege must give way”), it also chose the word “disclo-
sure,” rather than “testimony,” in the latter part of its sentence (“if a 
serious threat of harm to the patient or others can be averted only by 
means of a disclosure by the therapist”).220  
To “disclose” means “[t]o bring into view by uncovering; to ex-
pose; to make known; . . . to free from secrecy.”221  “Testimony,” on 
the other hand, is defined as “[e]vidence given by a competent wit-
ness under oath or affirmation; . . .  [a] particular kind of evidence 
  
217. Chase, 340 F.3d at 984 & 984 n.2. 
218. Id. at 993–98 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
219. Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  Furthermore, Judge Kleinfeld re-
minded the majority that Jaffee dealt only with the testimonial privilege, not with 
the question of the therapist’s authority to disclose threats to potential victims, 
which is a matter of state law and, therefore, outside the scope of the Jaffee opi-
nion.  Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
220. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996) (emphases added). 
221. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (5th ed. 1979). 
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that comes to tribunal through live witnesses speaking under oath or 
affirmation in presence of tribunal, judicial, or quasi-judicial.”222  If 
the Court intended to refer only to the testimonial privilege, as sug-
gested by Judge Kleinfeld, then it should have used the word “testi-
mony” rather than “disclosure,” and the footnote would have read: 
“[W]e do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege 
must give way . . . if a serious threat of harm to the patient or others 
can be averted only by means of the testimony . . . by the therapist.”  
On the other hand, it is possible, as the Chase majority noted, that 
the Court intended to endorse a therapist’s duty to divulge threats to 
intended victims.223  Hence, the Court’s use of the word “disclosure” 
in the latter part of the sentence should be interpreted to mean that, 
in attempting to protect innocent victims and comply with the “Ta-
rasoff duty,” a therapist would, in fact, reveal or “disclose” a pa-
tient’s threat to the authorities or the potential victim. 
In addition to the fact that footnote 19 is ambiguous, interpreting 
it as endorsing the use of the dangerous-patient exception in a wide 
variety of situations is wrong because this interpretation renders the 
footnote inconsistent with the rest of the Jaffee opinion.  One com-
mentator has argued that “it is nonsensical to interpret a footnote in 
dictum to stand for the proposition that a ‘dangerous patient excep-
tion’ should be recognized when it goes against the very core ratio-
nale for the privilege.”224  Additionally, it would be irrational for the 
Jaffee Court to have endorsed a dangerous-patient exception given 
the fact that it specifically noted its agreement with the Judicial Con-
ference Advisory Committee’s Proposed Rule 504225 that purpose-
fully rejected the exception.226   
  
222. Id. at 1324. 
223. Chase, 340 F.3d at 984. 
224. Paul S. Appelbaum, Privilege in the Federal Courts: Should There Be a 
“Dangerous Patient Exception”?, 59 L. & PSYCHIATRY 714, 715 (2008) (quoting 
Anthony Parsio, Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Perils of Re-
cognizing a “Dangerous-Patient Exception” in Criminal Trials, 41 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 623, 651 (2007)). 
225. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
241 (1972).   
226. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1996).  In fact, the Court has treated 
the Proposed Rules as instructive in other cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Gil-
lock, 445 U.S. 360, 367–68 (1980). 
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It is reasonable to believe, given the Court’s favorable recogni-
tion of Proposed Rule 504, that the Court intended to endorse one of 
the exceptions that was specifically contained in Proposed Rule 504, 
specifically the exception for involuntary hospitalization proceed-
ings.227  This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the 
“serious threat of harm to the patient or others” language used by 
Justice Stevens in footnote 19 is comparable to the “[d]angerousness 
to self or others” language that is incorporated in various forms into 
the involuntary commitment statutes of nearly all jurisdictions and is 
the most commonly used statutory element for involuntary inpatient 
commitment.228 
Those that disagree with this conclusion have suggested that the 
Court could not have intended to limit the dangerous-patient excep-
tion to involuntary commitment proceedings since mental health 
commitment proceedings are governed by state law and are held on-
ly in state courts.229  However, this position fails to consider the fact 
that involuntary mental health commitment proceedings involving 
Native American Indians are frequently conducted in tribal courts,230 
many of which have adopted the federal rules of evidence.231  Fur-
  
227. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
241 (1972).  The exception provides: “There is no privilege under this rule for 
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for 
mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has 
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.”  Id. 
228. JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, CIVIL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 145 (2001). 
229. See Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 715 (arguing that because state law regu-
lates commitment hearings, the Supreme Court could not have meant to regulate 
them). 
230. See Jay H. Shore et al., Telepsychiatry with Rural American Indians: Issues 
in Civil Commitments, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 287, 294–95 (2009).  Public Law No. 
83-280 transferred “limited federal jurisdiction over Indian reservations to the 
states of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin.”  Id. at 
293.  Other states, including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Washington, subsequently passed legisla-
tion asserting jurisdiction in accordance with Public Law No. 280.  Id.  In these 
states, civil commitment proceedings may be brought in either state court or tribal 
court.  Id. at 293–94.  In those states without jurisdiction under Public Law No. 
280, proceedings must be brought in tribal court.  Id. 
231. See, e.g., In re Amendment and Adoption of Supreme Court Rules and Pro-
cedures, Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation, Appendix, Rule 103, at 21 (pro-
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ther, since many states have fashioned their rules of evidence based 
on the federal rules, the decisions of federal courts that have inter-
preted these rules carry significant persuasive value in those states.  
Therefore, in those tribal courts that have adopted the federal rules 
and in the states that have adopted a privilege rule of evidence fa-
shioned after Federal Rule 501, federal court decisions interpreting 
this rule, particularly the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, are 
highly persuasive authority.232   
B.  The Sixth and Ninth  Circuits  Employed  the Correct Legal 
Analysis   
Two years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Jaffee, it granted certiorari in Swidler & Berlin v. United States.233  
In this case, the Court was asked to delineate the contours of the at-
torney-client privilege; specifically, it was asked to determine 
whether the attorney-client privilege survived after the death of a 
client.234  In deciding this issue, the Court employed the utilitarian 
approach, as it had recently done in Jaffee.235  It weighed the inter-
ests served by the privilege against the public’s interest in the proper 
administration of the judicial process and held that the privilege sur-
vived the death of the client.236  
In this case, the decedent, Vincent Foster, was the Deputy White 
House Counsel under President Bill Clinton.237  He met with James 
Hamilton, a partner at the firm of Swidler & Berlin, on a Sunday 
morning in the summer of 1993.238  Foster met with Hamilton in or-
  
viding that “[a]ll proceedings hereunder shall, so far as practicable, be conducted 
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure unless 
preempted within these rules”). 
232. See, e.g., People v. Paasche, 525 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) 
(noting agreement with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Zolin, 
491 U.S. 554 (1989), a case involving the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege).  
233. 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998). 
234. Id. at 402–03. 
235. Id. at 409. 
236. Id. at 410–11. 
237. Id. at 401. 
238. Id. at 401–02. 
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der to obtain legal representation for matters involving congressional 
and other investigations into the firings of employees from the White 
House Travel Office.239  Hamilton took three pages of handwritten 
notes during this meeting; nine days later, Foster committed sui-
cide.240  In 1995, special prosecutor Kenneth Starr began an investi-
gation into whether certain people had lied or obstructed justice in 
the earlier investigations.241  In December 1995, at Starr’s request, a 
federal grand jury issued subpoenas to Hamilton and Swidler & Ber-
lin for Hamilton’s handwritten notes of his earlier meeting with Fos-
ter.242  The petitioners objected on the grounds of attorney-client 
privilege and the work-product doctrine.243 
In determining the scope of the attorney-client privilege, the Su-
preme Court compared the injury to the attorney-client relationship 
caused by the disclosure of client communications to the benefit to 
be gained from the correct disposal of litigation.244  Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, noted that the attorney-client privilege 
is intended to “encourage ‘full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public inter-
ests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’”245  
Next, the Court cited Jaffee for the proposition that the loss of evi-
dence resulting from the privilege would be minimal since, without 
the privilege, it was unlikely that the patient would have made the 
  
239. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 401–02. 
240. Id. 
241. Fred C. Zacharias, The Fallacy That Attorney-Client Privilege Has Been 
Eroded:  Ramifications and Lessons for the Bar, 1999 PROF. LAW. 39, 47 (1999). 
242. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402. 
243. Id.  Because the Court found that the attorney-client privilege survived the 
death of the client, it did not decide the work-product issue.  Id. at 403 n.1.  The 
D.C. Circuit had ruled that the privilege was not absolute.  In re Sealed Case, 124 
F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  It applied a balancing test and opined that the risk 
of posthumous disclosure, limited to the criminal context, would have a minimal 
chilling effect on client communications, whereas the cost of protecting these 
communications after death was significant.  Id. at 233.  The court also found that 
the uncertainty introduced by the balancing test was minor, given the fact that 
several other exceptions to the attorney-client privilege exist.  Id. at 234.  It held 
that there is a posthumous exception to the privilege for communications that are 
of substantial importance in a criminal case.  Id. 
244. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403–10. 
245. Id. at 403 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). 
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communication.246  The Court found this reasoning to apply with 
equal force to the attorney-client relationship and concluded that, 
absent the privilege’s posthumous application, it was unlikely that 
the client would have made the disclosures to his attorney.247     
Prosecutor Starr argued that an exception to the privilege should 
be allowed in criminal cases.248  He suggested that this exception 
would have minimal impact on the privilege if the disclosure of con-
fidential attorney-client communications were restricted to informa-
tion that would be of “substantial importance to a particular criminal 
case.”249  The Court rejected this argument, noting that there was no 
case authority for the proposition that a privilege should apply diffe-
rently in civil and criminal cases.250  And, just as it had in Jaffee, the 
Court rejected the use of a case-by-case balancing test, commenting: 
“Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client 
interests, even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial un-
certainty into the privilege’s application.  For just that reason, we 
have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the 
privilege.”251   
  
246. Id. at 408 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996)). 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 408–10. 
249. Id. at 408. 
250. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09. 
251. Id. at 409.  Finally, even though Justice Rehnquist expressed some concern 
over the lack of empirical evidence to support the contention that a client will be 
less likely to share confidences with his attorney if he knows that the information 
will not remain privileged after his death, the Court nonetheless held that the at-
torney-client privilege survived the death of a client.  Id. at 407.  The Court stated:  
[W]e think there are weighty reasons that counsel in favor of posthumous 
application.  Knowing that communications will remain confidential even 
after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with 
counsel.  While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of 
information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to 
posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to as-
sume that it vanishes altogether.  Clients may be concerned about reputa-
tion, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family.  Posthumous 
disclosure of such communication may be as feared as disclosure during 
the client’s lifetime. 
Id. 
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In deciding whether to recognize a dangerous-patient exception 
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, both the Sixth and Ninth 
Circuits followed the utilitarian approach that the Court employed in 
Jaffee and Swidler & Berlin.252  As the Supreme Court did in Swidler 
& Berlin, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits examined the public and pri-
vate interests at stake in protecting a patient’s confidential commu-
nications and compared these interests to the benefits to be gained 
from the correct disposal of litigation.253  The Sixth Circuit noted 
that informing a patient that his statements could be used against him 
in criminal proceedings would “certainly chill and very likely termi-
nate open dialogue.”254  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the benefits accruing from protecting the privilege far outweigh any 
evidentiary gain resulting from the compelled testimony.255  Quoting 
the Sixth Circuit, it stated: “[I]f our Nation’s mental health is indeed 
as valuable as the Supreme Court has indicated, and we think it is, 
the chilling effect that would result from the recognition of a ‘dan-
gerous patient’ exception and its logical consequences is the first 
reason to reject it.”256 
In contrast, the test adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Glass was a 
case-by-case balancing test—the approach that was specifically re-
jected by the Supreme Court in both Jaffee and Swidler & Berlin.257  
The Glass test allows the admission of confidential patient commu-
nications at trial if the court determines that both the threat was se-
rious when made and that harm can only be averted by disclosure.258  
The second prong of this test requires the court to evaluate and 
weigh the evidence on a case-by-case basis and also requires that the 
court find that the therapist’s testimony to be of considerable impor-
tance to the case.259  This is the identical method proposed by Prose-
  
252. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2000). 
253. See Chase, 340 F.3d at 990–91; Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85. 
254. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85. 
255. Chase, 340 F.3d at 990. 
256. Id. at 990–91 (quoting Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85). 
257. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998); see Swidler & 
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (rejecting a balancing test); Jaf-
fee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996) (rejecting a balancing test). 
258. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1359–60. 
259. Id. 
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cutor Starr in Swidler & Berlin, which was rejected by the Supreme 
Court on the ground that balancing “the importance of the informa-
tion [in a particular case] against client interests . . . introduces sub-
stantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application.  For just that rea-
son, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours 
of the privilege.”260   
Furthermore, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits were correct in refus-
ing to draw a distinction between criminal and civil cases.261  The 
Supreme Court made it clear in Swidler & Berlin that there was no 
authority for treating privileges one way in criminal cases and anoth-
er way in civil cases.262  Although Swidler & Berlin involved the 
attorney-client privilege, whereas the dangerous-patient exception 
implicates the psychotherapist-patient privilege, this is a distinction 
without a difference.  These privileges should be afforded the same 
treatment because similar policy reasons justify them.  Confidentiali-
ty is necessary in both of these relationships to encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and clients as well as be-
tween therapists and their patients in order to promote broader public 
interests in the administration of justice and the mental health of this 
country’s citizenry. 
C.  Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Reason and  Experience   
Requirement  
1.   The States’ Experience 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides in relevant part:   
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
  
260. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409. 
261. Concurring in Chase, Judge Kleinfeld would have required the therapist to 
testify to threats made by the patient, stating: “As a percipient witness to a felony, 
she ought to be required to testify to what she perceived.”  Chase, 340 F.3d at 994.  
Likewise, the dissent in Hayes seemed to find the fact that the case was a criminal 
prosecution to be significant, noting: “[I]t is important to recognize that, if the 
proffered evidence is believed, what occurred here was a crime.”  Hayes, 227 F.3d 
at 588.  This distinction is also implicit in Glass, which was a criminal case.  See 
Glass, 133 F.3d at 1356. 
262. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09. 
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scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or polit-
ical subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of 
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and experience.263 
In determining that “reason and experience”264 supported the recog-
nition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Jaffee Court took 
note of the fact that the privilege was recognized in each of the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia.265  However, because there is 
considerable discrepancy among the states with respect to a therap-
ist’s duty to third parties and little agreement regarding the danger-
ous-patient exception to the testimonial privilege, the experience of 
the states does not provide a basis for recognizing a dangerous-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
It is important at this point to note the distinction between the 
“Tarasoff duty” to protect and the dangerous-patient exception to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  A therapist’s “Tarasoff duty” to 
warn, or otherwise protect third parities from potential harm, is an 
exception to a therapist’s ethical duty of confidentiality and is en-
forced independently of the evidentiary rules of privilege.266  Privi-
leges, on the other hand, protect only against compelled testimony in 
legal proceedings.267  In some ways, ethical rules may provide more 
protection than legal privileges because the duty of confidentiality is 
not limited to judicial settings and applies to matters not covered by 
privileges, such as non-confidential communications and secrets that 
are not communications.  Many mental health professionals believe 
that absolute confidentiality can only be assured if an evidentiary 
privilege applies alongside a professional duty of confidentiality, 
because the fact that there is a professional ethical requirement of 
confidentiality does not mean that an evidentiary privilege exists and 
visa versa.268 
  
263. FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added). 
264.  Id. 
265.  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6 (1996). 
266.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.2. 
267.  Id. 
268. In a jurisdiction that does not recognize a privilege, a person called as a wit-
ness can be compelled to disclose confidential information.  In fact, most ethical 
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Most states recognize an exception to the ethical duty of confi-
dentiality in one form or another.269  There are, however, considera-
ble variations among the states.  The majority of states limit a the-
rapist’s duty to protect potential victims to situations where the pa-
tient has made a serious threat to an identifiable individual.270  In 
approximately half of the states, a therapist’s duty to warn of poten-
tial danger is mandatory; in others this duty is merely permissive.271  
A few states impose no such duty at all.272 
There is also disagreement among the states regarding the specif-
ic types of protective measures that a therapist is required to take.  
The disarray among the states with respect to a therapist’s duty to 
protect potential victims has been described as “virtually unprece-
dented for any widespread legal doctrine.”273  Some states impose on 
a therapist only a duty to warn, whereas others require a therapist to 
warn and take additional steps to protect the potential victim.274  For 
example, a Colorado statute provides:  
When there is a duty to warn and protect under the circums-
tances specified above, the duty shall be discharged by the 
mental health care provider making reasonable and timely ef-
forts to notify any person or persons specifically threatened, 
as well as notifying an appropriate law enforcement agency 
or by taking other appropriate action including, but not li-
mited to, hospitalizing the patient.275 
  
standards provide an exception to the confidentiality requirement when the disclo-
sure is required by law.  See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF 
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Standard 4: Privacy and Confidentiality 
(2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx. 
269. See Elisia Klinka, Note, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising Patients of the Tara-
soff Duty and Its Legal Consequences for the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient 
Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 885 (2009). 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 885–86. 
272. Id. at 886; see, e.g., Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. 1999). 
273. Klinka, supra note 269, at 886 (quoting Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A. 
Young, Tarasoff at Twenty-Five, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 275, 280 
(2002)). 
274. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 160.   
275. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010). 
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The duty to protect is the majority rule, whereas the duty to warn is 
the minority rule.276  Additionally, a few states, like California, have 
created safe harbors for therapists whose patients have threatened 
others during therapy sessions.277  In California, a therapist’s statuto-
ry duty is fulfilled when the psychotherapist “mak[es] reasonable 
efforts to communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a 
law enforcement agency.”278   
There is similar disarray among the states with respect to the 
recognition of the dangerous-patient exception to the testimonial 
privilege.279  Much of this confusion stems from the legislatures’ and 
the courts’ tendency to conflate the ethical duty of confidentiality 
with the testimonial privilege.  This confusion is also the result of 
ambiguous statutes, which fail to make this distinction clear.  Al-
though California is the only state that includes a dangerous-patient 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege as part of its evi-
dence code,280 a few other jurisdictions have statutes that clearly ap-
pear to create an exception to the testimonial privilege.281  For ex-
ample, a Wyoming statute entitled “Privileged communication” be-
gins with the language “[i]n judicial proceedings” and prohibits a 
therapist from disclosing confidential information except in a series 
  
276. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 160. 
277.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(b) (West 2007). 
278. Id. 
279. Some states apply a balancing test in determining whether to recognize the 
privilege and allow disclosure of confidential communications if the information is 
“sufficiently relevant to the proceeding . . . to outweigh the importance of main-
taining confidentiality . . . .”  Harris, supra note 90, at 41–42 & 42 n.45 (quoting 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2008). 
280.  Id. at 43.  The statute provides: 
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasona-
ble cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condi-
tion as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another 
and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the 
threatened danger.  
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 2009).   
281. Harris, supra note 90, at 42.  Florida also appears to recognize this exception.  
See Guerrier v. Florida, 811 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“[T]he 
Legislature intended to allow admission of the psychiatrist’s testimony in a subse-
quent prosecution of the dangerous patient for offenses committed against the 
victim.”).   
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of enumerated situations, including situations where “an immediate 
threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim is 
disclosed to the psychologist.”282  Likewise, Illinois provides for the 
abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege “in trials for ho-
micide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate 
circumstances of the homicide,” mental competency proceedings, 
malpractice actions, and cases involving the validity of a will.283  
Ohio allows “testimony” when a patient’s communications to his 
therapist indicate a “clear and present danger to the client or other 
persons.”284   
  
282. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-123 (2009). 
283. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/5 (West 2007). 
284. Ohio’s statute specifically references testimony and states: “The following 
persons shall not testify in certain respects . . . unless . . . the communication . . . 
indicates clear and present danger to the client or other persons.”  OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2317.02(G)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011).  Other states appear to 
draw the distinction between the disclosure of confidential communications and 
testimony.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 2000 & Supp. 
2011).  The Massachusetts statute provides:   
[I]n any court proceeding . . . a patient shall have the privilege of refusing 
to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing, any communica-
tion, wherever made, between said patient and a psychotherapist . . . [ex-
cept] [i]f a psychotherapist, in the course of his diagnosis or treatment of 
the patient, determines that the patient is in need to treatment in a hospital 
for mental or emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently dan-
gerous activity by the patient against himself or another person and on the 
basis of such determination discloses such communication either for the 
purpose of placing or retaining the patient in such hospital . . . or placing 
the patient under arrest or under the supervision of law enforcement au-
thorities.   
Id.; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207(a) (2000) (“Neither the psychiatrist nor 
any member of the staff may testify or be compelled to testify as to such [confiden-
tial] communications or otherwise reveal them in such proceedings without con-
sent of the patient . . . .”) (emphasis added).  The Tennessee statute allows for 
three exceptions.  Id.  These exceptions are mental health proceedings, court or-
dered examinations, and where the patient has placed his emotional condition at 
issue in a case.  See id. § 24-1-207(a)(1)–(3).  However, the statute also provides 
that “[p]rivileged communications . . . may be disclosed without consent if . . . [a] 
patient has made an actual threat to physically harm an identifiable victim or vic-
tims . . . .”  Id. § 24-1-207(c)(1)(A).  It also provides immunity for mental health 
professions in certain circumstances: “No civil or criminal action shall be insti-
tuted, nor shall liability be imposed due to the disclosure of otherwise confidential 
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Other states have statutes that address situations involving dan-
gerous patients; however, it is not clear whether the required disclo-
sure is intended to be an exception to the therapist’s ethical duty of 
confidentiality or an exception to the testimonial privilege.  For ex-
ample, a West Virginia statute provides: “Confidential information 
shall not be disclosed, except . . . [t]o protect against a clear and sub-
stantial danger of imminent injury by a patient . . . to himself or oth-
ers.”285  A South Carolina statute entitled “Confidences of patients of 
mental illness or emotional conditions” allows a therapist to “re-
veal . . . the intention of the patient to commit a crime or harm him-
self and the information necessary to prevent the crime or harm.”286   
Connecticut’s statutory scheme exemplifies the confusion sur-
rounding the distinction between a therapist’s ethical duty of confi-
dentiality and the testimonial privilege.  One Connecticut statute is 
entitled “Disclosure of privileged communications between marital 
and family therapist and person consulting such therapist prohibited.  
Exceptions.”287  It allows disclosure of “communications . . . [w]here 
a marital and family therapist believes in good faith that the failure 
to disclose such communications presents a clear and present danger 
to the health or safety of any individual.”288  Even though the title of 
the statute contains the word “privilege,” which would lead some to 
conclude that the therapist could be compelled to testify against a 
patient, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recently held just the op-
  
communications . . . pursuant to this section.”  Id. § 24-1-207(c)(2).  This statute, 
therefore, appears to allow a therapist to reveal a patient’s threats to the authorities 
and potential victims and to provide immunity from liability as a result of the dis-
closure, while it also appears to prohibit a therapist from testifying about these 
threats in criminal proceedings.  
285. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2008); see also MICH. COMP. 
LAWS SERV. § 333.18237 (LexisNexis 2008). 
286. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95(C)(3) (Supp. 2010).  This statute is included 
under Title 19 of the South Carolina statutes that is entitled “Evidence.”  Id.  How-
ever, there is no mention of judicial proceedings or testimony in the section whose 
title is “Confidences of patients of mental illness or emotional conditions.”  Id. 
287. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146q (West 2005). 
288. Id. § 52-146q(c)(2). 
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posite.289  In 2009, the court interpreted a related statute to prohibit 
in-court testimony by a social worker.290 
In summary, it is clear that there is no consensus among the 
states with respect to a therapist’s duty to protect potential victims, 
and much confusion exists in the law regarding exceptions to a the-
rapist’s duty of confidentiality and the dangerous-patient exception 
to the testimonial privilege.  Hence, the “reason and experience” of 
the states operate against the recognition of this exception.  
It has been suggested that because several exceptions to the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege already exist, “reason and experience” 
favor the recognition of the dangerous-patient exception to this privi-
lege.291  It has also been argued that when other exceptions to a pri-
vilege exist, the impact of an additional exception is marginal.292  It 
does appear that the trend amongst the states is to extend the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege to a wide variety of mental health profes-
sionals, while limiting its use through the creation of numerous ex-
ceptions.293  Currently, some twenty jurisdictions recognize the three 
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege contained in Pro-
posed Rule 504 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,294 and virtually all 
states recognize exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
in cases involving child abuse and neglect.295  That being said, the 
fact that the state law of privilege is riddled with exceptions and has 
been described as a “crazy quilt pattern of legislation across the 
  
289. See State v. Orr, 969 A.2d 750, 756 (Conn. 2009). 
290. Id. 
291. See, e.g., B. Joseph Wadsworth, Evidence—Recognition of a Federal Psy-
chotherapist-Patient Privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996), 32 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 873, 880–81 (1997). 
292. This was Kenneth Starr’s argument in Swidler & Berlin.  See Swidler & 
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998). 
293. Harriet L. Glosoff et al., Privileged Communication in the Counselor-Client 
Relationship, 78 J. OF COUNSELING & DEV. 454, 455 (2000). 
294. Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It Save Our Children?, 
28 SETON HALL L. REV 963, 971 (1998).  In these states, communications between 
therapists and patients are not privileged if for court proceedings requiring hospita-
lization, communications during a court-ordered examination of the mental or 
emotional condition of the patient, or communications when the mental or emo-
tional condition of the patient is an element of a claim or defense.  See Rules of 
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240–41 (1972). 
295. Glosoff et al., supra note 293, at 456; see also Paruch, supra note 11, at 537. 
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country” is no justification for recognizing additional ones.296  In 
fact, just the opposite is true.  This was acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court in Swidler & Berlin, where the Court stated: “A ‘no 
harm in one more exception’ rationale could contribute to the gener-
al erosion of the privilege, without reference to common-law prin-
ciples or ‘reason and experience.’”297  Indeed, two years earlier in 
Jaffee the Court stated: “An uncertain privilege, or one which pur-
ports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the 
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”298   
2. “Reason  and  Experience” –  The  Other Communication 
Privileges  
Determining whether the “reason and experience” requirement of 
Rule 501 justifies the recognition of the dangerous-patient exception 
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege should also require an ex-
amination and comparison of the other federal communication privi-
leges, the rationale justifying these privileges, and the commonly 
recognized exceptions to these privileges.  The “reason and expe-
rience” requirement of Rule 501 should command consistent treat-
ment of those privileges that are based on common rationales and are 
  
296. Glosoff et al., supra note 293, at 455; see id. at 455–58 (providing a table 
illustrating the exceptions to the privilege by state and the District of Columbia).  
Many federal courts have recognized a patient-litigant exception to the psychothe-
rapist-patient privilege, which was provided for in the rejected Federal Rule of 
Evidence 504(d)(3).  Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing 
Scope of Federal Psychotherapists-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 1, 19 
(2000).  The proposed rule crafted an exception for “communications relevant to 
an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in 
which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.”  Rules 
of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972).  
The majority of federal cases interpreting Jaffee have involved this exception, 
which arises most frequently in claims in civil cases for emotional distress, purpor-
tedly the result of the defendant’s conduct.  Nelken, supra note 296, at 20–21; see 
also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the Eviscera-
tion of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L. 
REV 79, 80 (2008).  Professor Smith describes the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege as a “body of law in disarray” with inconsistent methods of enforcement, 
sometimes within the same district.  Id. 
297. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410. 
298.  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). 
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supported by comparable public policies, unless a compelling reason 
exists to justify different treatment.  Ensuring consistent treatment of 
privileges provides certainty to the law of privileges and further 
serves to promote the policies upon which they were created.   
The following section presents a discussion of the commonly 
recognized communication privileges, the underlying rationale sup-
porting those privileges, and the generally recognized exceptions to 
each of them.  It demonstrates that although the attorney-client, 
spousal-communication, clergy-penitent, and psychotherapist-patient 
privileges all share a similar purpose—to prevent intrusion into cer-
tain select relationships and protect communications between the 
parties in these relationships—neither the common law nor statutory 
law has carved out an analogous exception to the dangerous-patient 
exception for the attorney-client, spousal-communication, or clergy-
penitent privileges.  
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the confidential 
communication privileges known to the common law.299  It was in-
itially rooted in the notion of loyalty, based on a code of honor hold-
ing that to require a person to divulge a secret is itself a breach of a 
moral duty and, thus, is wrong.300  McCormick has described the 
rationale for the contemporary attorney-client privilege as resting on 
three propositions.301  First, the complexity of modern day law re-
quires that people have the assistance of attorneys in order to settle 
their disputes and manage their affairs.302  The second proposition is 
that attorneys will be unable to properly assist their clients unless 
they are fully informed of the facts of the client’s situation.303  Third, 
clients cannot be expected to provide their attorneys with all of the 
facts without the assurance that the attorney cannot be compelled to 
reveal these confidences in court.304  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
  
299. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
300. Shuman, supra note 17, at 667. 
301. BROUN ET AL., supra note 14, § 87, at 150–51. 
302.  Id. 
303.  Id. 
304.  Id. 
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described the rationale supporting the attorney-client privilege as: 
“The privilege is intended to encourage ‘full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and the administration of 
justice.’”305 
In addition to the privilege, attorney ethical rules also protect 
communications between attorneys and clients, similar to the ethical 
rules that protect communications between mental health profession-
als and their patients.306  Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 
requires an attorney to protect “information relating to the represen-
tation of a client” unless the client consents to the disclosure.307  It 
also allows disclosure in select circumstances, including the preven-
tion of injury to the financial or property interests of others and con-
troversies between an attorney and client.308  The Rule also contains 
a dangerous-client exception, providing that: “A lawyer may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent reasonably cer-
tain death or substantial bodily harm.”309  This rule is permissive: It 
gives the attorney discretion to determine whether to disclose the 
information.310  The comments to Rule 1.6 of the Michigan Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide insight into the decision in favor of a 
permissive, as opposed to a compulsory, disclosure rule:   
[I]t is very difficult for a lawyer to ‘know’ when such a hein-
ous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may 
have a change of mind.  To require disclosure when the client 
intends such an act, at the risk of professional discipline if the 
assessment of the client’s purpose turns out to be wrong, 
would be to impose a penal risk that might interfere with the 
  
305. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 404 (1998) (quoting Upjohn 
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). 
306.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
307.  Id. at R. 1.6(a). 
308. Id. at R. 1.6(b). 
309. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). 
310. An earlier version of the 1983 Model Rules would have made this disclosure 
mandatory, however, it was changed after strong opposition was voiced to the 
mandatory disclosure requirement.  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. 
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE 281 (2009). 
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lawyer’s resolution of an inherently difficult moral dilem-
ma.311 
Presently, every jurisdiction’s ethical rules contain a dangerous-
client exception; some states allow an attorney to disclose client con-
fidences while other states require disclosure by the attorney when 
the attorney believes a client is likely to commit an act expected to 
result in serious injury or death.312  At present, eleven states mandate 
that an attorney reveal confidential information in order to prevent 
the client from killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on a third 
party.313  However, even with these mandatory reporting require-
ments, there is little empirical evidence demonstrating that attorneys 
actually warn third parties of threats made by their clients.314  More-
over, there is no evidence that lawyers are actually disciplined for 
failing to give such warnings; there are no reported disciplinary cas-
es against attorneys for failing to warn under these circumstances.315 
Furthermore, unlike the disclosure rules applicable to mental 
health professionals, attorneys are not held liable in tort for injuries 
to third parties caused by their clients because the common law of 
tort has not extended the “Tarasoff duty” to attorneys.316  There are 
no reported cases in which courts have held attorneys civilly liable 
for the failure to warn third parties about a client’s dangerous inten-
tions, and the few courts that have addressed this issue have held to 
the contrary.317  It has been argued that no special relationship exists 
  
311. MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2010).  Although the Model 
Rules limit the disclosure to situations involving death or serious bodily injury, 
other states allow attorneys to disclose client information under more expansive 
criteria.  For example, the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attor-
ney to reveal “the intention of a client to commit a crime and the information ne-
cessary to prevent the crime.”  Id. at R. 1.6(c)(4). 
312. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a 
Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1627, 1679–80 (2003). 
313. Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a 
Lawyer Fails to Warn a Third Party of a Client’s Threat to Cause Serious Physi-
cal Harm or Death, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 481 n.4 (2000). 
314. Id. at 482. 
315. Id. at 481. 
316. Id. at 480. 
317. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1683. 
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between an attorney and a client, unlike that found to exist between a 
patient and a therapist, principally because of the difficulty of deter-
mining the appropriate standard of care.318  Those advocating for this 
position draw a distinction between therapists and attorneys on the 
grounds that attorneys do not receive any special training in evaluat-
ing the seriousness and legitimacy of a client’s threats.319  
However, this position assumes that mental health professionals 
possess the skills that allow them to accurately predict behavior.  
Yet, studies have shown the opposite to be true.  It is suggested that 
“[a]t best it would seem that clinicians can predict violent behavior 
with an accuracy rate that is slightly better than chance.”320  After an 
in-depth study of the empirical data in this area, one researcher has 
concluded: “I do not believe that either the researcher or legal scho-
lar has delivered very much that is really useful to frontline clini-
cians making violence risk assessments in the wide variety of set-
tings in which these assessments are required.”321 
Further, therapists often have difficulty determining if the dange-
rousness threshold is met and, therefore, if the “Tarasoff duty” is 
invoked.322  But because of the law’s current emphasis on the duty to 
  
318. See Cooper, supra note 313, at 503–04.  Some authors have suggested that 
the lack of training in predicting human behavior or evaluating the mental health 
of a client is all the more reason for requiring mandatory reporting by attorneys of 
threats made by their clients.  See Deborah Abramovsky, A Case for Increased 
Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 43, 51 (1985).  However, one empirical study 
suggested that lawyers do not have difficulty evaluating the seriousness of threats 
by a client to kill or seriously harm another person.  See Leslie C. Levin, Testing 
the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to 
Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 114–17 (1994). 
319.  Cooper, supra note 313, at 503–04. 
320. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 176.  This is a serious issue that de-
serves meaningful discussion; however an in-depth analysis of this topic is beyond 
the scope of this article.  For a more complete discussion, see Christopher Slobo-
gin, Involuntary Community Treatment of People Who Are Violent and Mentally 
Ill:  A Legal Analysis, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 685 (1994). 
321. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 178 (citing Henry J. Steadman, From 
Dangerousness to Risk Assessment of Community Violence: Taking Stock at the 
Turn of the Century, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 269 (2000)). 
322. This argument was made by the American Psychiatric Association in Tara-
soff but was rejected without discussion by the California Supreme Court.  Tara-
soff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976).  One commen-
tator has noted:  “The courts have had little difficulty in imposing liability through 
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warn, therapists are more apt to err on the side of warning and will 
often ignore other more effective clinical interventions.323 
The other key argument that is advanced in support of not ex-
tending the “Tarasoff duty” to attorneys is that attorneys have a 
“unique role” as advocates for their clients and that imposing duties 
on attorneys to protect third parties would be “contrary to the client-
centered model of our adversarial system.”324  In fact, this argument 
applies with equal force to mental health professionals who also 
have a “unique role” as advocates for their patients.325  It is also con-
tended that because attorneys have an ongoing role to play within the 
legal system with respect to a client, “forced disclosure might drive a 
wedge between the attorney and any client whom he continues to 
represent.”326  Yet, this was the Jaffee Court’s precise justification 
for the psychotherapist-patient privilege—the need to protect the 
trust and confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient relationship 
which it found to be a “sine qua non for successful psychiatric 
treatment.”327 
Finally, although the rules of professional responsibility provide 
for a dangerous-patient exception to the ethical duty of confidentiali-
ty, there is no recognized dangerous-person exception to the attor-
ney-client testimonial privilege.  The crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege is a close counterpart; however, there is a 
significant distinction between these two exceptions.  In order for the 
crime-fraud exception to abrogate the attorney-client testimonial 
privilege, it must be shown that the communications between the 
attorney and the client were made in the furtherance of a crime or 
  
hindsight analysis.”  PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 184 (quoting ROBERT I. 
SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 314 (2d ed. 1992)).  It is also clear 
that mental health professionals are uncomfortable dealing with the legal concept 
of dangerousness, which is distinguishable from violence.  Id.  While dangerous-
ness is a “legal status,” which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and judge to 
judge, violence is a “social science concept and the primary subject when clinical 
assessments are being made about dangerousness to others.”  Id. at 175. 
323. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 184. 
324. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1683. 
325. This is a key reason why mental health professionals have long advocated for 
the right to protect the confidential communications of their patients.  See id. 
326. Id. at 1683 n.283. 
327. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). 
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fraud and that the client sought the advice of the attorney to assist in 
carrying out the crime or fraud.328  The Supreme Court has explained 
that the purpose of the exception is to assure that the “seal of secre-
cy” between attorney and client does not protect communications 
“made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a 
fraud or crime.”329  Therefore, although an attorney may disclose (or, 
in some states, must disclose) information about a dangerous client, 
the attorney can be compelled to testify only if the client actually 
sought the attorney’s assistance or advice in furtherance of the dan-
gerous activity.  This, of course, stands in stark contrast to the dan-
gerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
where not only can therapists be compelled to testify about clients’ 
threats, but, in many instances, this testimony actually has been the 
only evidence used to criminally convict a patient.330 
b. The Marital Privileges 
There are two generally recognized marital privileges: the spous-
al-testimonial privilege and the marital-communications privilege.  
The testimonial privilege allows a witness to refuse to testify against 
a spouse in a criminal proceeding and, in some jurisdictions, gives a 
criminal defendant the right to prohibit a spouse from testifying 
against him.331  The marital-communications privilege, which is rec-
  
328. BROUN ET AL., supra note 14, § 95, at 164–65. 
329. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting O’Rourke v. Dar-
bishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604 (P.C.)). 
330. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2009) (using a 
therapist’s testimony to convict a defendant for threatening the President of the 
United States). 
331. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.31.  This privilege evolved 
from the common law doctrine that rendered a spouse incompetent to testify for or 
against the other spouse.  Id.  This spousal disqualification originated from two 
cannons of medieval jurisprudence: the rule that a party is ineligible to testify on 
his own behalf because of his interest in the proceedings and the legal fiction that a 
wife and her husband are the same person.  Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 
40, 44 (1980).  The rationale for the testimonial privilege is to preserve the harmo-
ny and sanctity of the marriage relationship.  Id. at 52.  Up until the Supreme 
Court’s 1980 decision in Trammel, both spouses held the testimonial privilege in 
federal courts.  Id. at 53.  In Trammel, the Court altered this long standing rule, 
holding that the testimonial privilege vests solely in the testifying spouse.  Id.  In 
 
File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3 Created on:  6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM 
388    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 3  
ognized in federal courts and in nearly all of the states,332 prevents 
the compelled disclosure of “information privately disclosed be-
tween husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relation-
ship.”333  The rationale for this privilege is the desire to protect the 
trust and privacy of the spousal relationship and allow spouses to 
communicate freely and in confidence with each other.334 
There are only a few well-recognized exceptions to the marital 
privileges.  The first commonly recognized exception to these privi-
leges arises in proceedings where one spouse is charged with a tort 
or crime against the other spouse or a child of either, or against the 
property of the other spouse.335  Another frequently recognized ex-
ception arises in actions by one spouse against the other,336 which 
occurs most frequently in divorce proceedings.337  Finally, the joint-
participant exception, recognized by virtually all of the federal cir-
cuit courts but not all of the states, is an exception to the marital-
communications privilege for ongoing or future crimes.338  However, 
in order for this exception to abrogate the marital-communications 
privilege, it must be demonstrated that both spouses were partici-
pants in a crime, or actively involved in planning a crime, at the time 
of the communication.339  The common law “Tarasoff duty” to warn 
or protect third parties from potential harm by a spouse does not ap-
  
so holding, it noted “[t]he ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have 
long since disappeared” and the contemporary justifications (preserving marital 
harmony) are “unpersuasive” when the witness is willing to testify against the 
spouse.  Id. at 52. 
332. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.32. 
333. Id.  
334. Id.  
335. Id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2162(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2008).  
The Michigan statute states: 
The spousal privileges . . . and the confidential communications privilege 
. . . do not apply in any of the following: . . . (d) In a cause of action that 
grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other or that 
grows out of the refusal or neglect to furnish the spouse or children with 
suitable support. 
Id. 
336. BROUN ET AL., supra note 14, § 84, at 146–47. 
337. Id. 
338.  See id. 
339. See id.  
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ply and there is no equivalent dangerous-person exception to this 
privilege. 
c.  The Clergy-Penitent Privilege 
The clergy-penitent privilege is more closely aligned to the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege than the other two communication pri-
vileges addressed above because it protects disclosures made in con-
nection with professional, spiritual, and personal counseling that 
frequently involves deeply personal and intensely emotional matters.   
The clergy-penitent privilege is recognized in every state by sta-
tute and at common law in federal court.340  The statutory form of 
the privilege varies widely among the states but generally serves to 
protect communications made in confidence to a clergyman in his or 
her professional or spiritual capacity.341  Although the states are split 
as to who holds the privilege, the majority of states assign the privi-
lege to the parishioner.342 
This privilege is the least defensible under the utilitarian ap-
proach.343  If the penitent believes strongly in the need to confess, 
the utilitarian case for this privilege becomes critically weak, since 
the communications between the clergyman and the penitent are 
likely to be made irrespective of the presence of the privilege.344  
Therefore, the rationale for this privilege appears to be grounded in 
privacy concerns rather than the utilitarian principles that seem to 
provide the foundation for the other communication privileges.  This 
privilege is “based in part upon the idea that the human being does 
sometimes have need of a place of penitence and confession and spi-
ritual discipline.  When any person enters that secret chamber, this 
closes the door upon him, and civil authority turns away its ear.”345   
This privilege is also unique in that it has been defined broadly 
by legislatures and interpreted broadly by courts, some suggest, out 
  
340. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.2.3, at 525.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledges this privilege.  See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 
(1980).   
341. See Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1630. 
342. Id. at 1650. 
343. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.2.3, at 529. 
344. Id. 
345. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 294 (Iowa 1917). 
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of fear that a narrow interpretation might interfere with religious 
freedom.346  There are virtually no exceptions to the privilege.  
Moreover, courts have consistently refused to impose tort liability on 
members of the clergy as a result of their failure to warn third parties 
of a parishioner’s dangerous plans.347   
Even in the area of mandated reporting of child abuse and neg-
lect,348 only thirty-two states include clergy in their list of mandated 
reporters.349  And in fifteen of these states, the privilege survives the 
duty to report.350  In other words, the duty to report does not apply to 
information obtained in the confidential religious counseling set-
ting.351  Furthermore, although ten states have mandatory reporting 
statutes that indicate that the clergy-penitent privilege is “abrogated” 
in cases of child abuse and neglect, it remains unclear whether the 
duty to report would also require the clergy member to testify in sub-
sequent legal proceedings.352  In Wyoming, for example, clergy are 
required to report suspected cases of child abuse irrespective of the 
source of the information; however, they are not required to testify in 
later proceedings.353 
The objective of the law with respect to the communication pri-
vileges is the protection of confidential communications within se-
lected relationships in order to advance important social policy 
goals.  In the attorney-client relationship, confidentiality serves to 
promote “the observance of the law and the administration of jus-
  
346. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1673. 
347. Id. at 1685. 
348. Mandated reporting statutes generally require that professionals with fre-
quent contact with children to report suspected cases of abuse or neglect to the 
state Department of Social Services.  Id. at 1667.  These statutes also provide the 
reporter with immunity from civil liability for reporting suspected cases and carry 
misdemeanor criminal penalties for failure to report when required to do so.  Id. 
349. Id. at 1668. 
350.  Id. at 1669. 
351. Id. 
352.  Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1670. 
353. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (2009).  In nine other states, clergy have a duty 
to report irrespective of the source of the information and can be compelled to 
testify in subsequent proceedings.  See Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1670–71 & 
n.226.  The author notes that, notwithstanding the wording of these statutes, 
whether a court would deny an assertion of the clergy-penitent privilege in a judi-
cial proceeding is open to debate.  Id. at 1670. 
File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3 Created on: 6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM 
2011 DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION 391 
tice.”354  The marital-communications privilege serves to “foster ma-
rital relationships by encouraging communications.”355  And while 
the clergy-penitent privilege may serve to protect free exercise of 
religion, it principally serves to protect an individual’s right to priva-
cy.356   
The social policy goal served by the psychotherapist-patient pri-
vilege—improving the mental health of the citizenry—is equally as 
important as the policies served by the other privileges addressed 
above.  Moreover, protecting the confidential relationship between a 
therapist and patient is the cornerstone to achieving this goal.  All of 
the major psychotherapeutic theories indicate that successful therapy 
outcomes are dependent upon the relationship between the therapist 
and the patient.357  The American Psychoanalytic Association be-
lieves that analysis cannot proceed without the formation of a trust-
ing therapeutic alliance.358  The threat that a therapist might reveal a 
patient’s most revealing secrets in a court of law would “stand as a 
permanent obstacle to development of the necessary degree of pa-
  
354. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
355. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.2.1, at 507. 
356. Id. § 6.2.3(b), at 529–530. 
357. See Patricia Honea-Boles & Jean E. Griffin, The Court Mandated Client: 
Does Limiting Confidentiality Preclude a Therapeutic Encounter?, 29 TEX. 
COUNSELING ASS’N J. 149, 150 (2001) (citing Charles J. Gelso & Jean A. Carter, 
Components of the Psychotherapy Relationship: Their Interaction and Unfolding 
During Treatment, 41 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 296 (1994)).  The therapists’ 
warmth or acceptance and empathic resonance are positively correlated with the-
rapeutic outcome.  Id. (citing D.E. Orlinsky & K.I. Howard, Process and Outcome 
in Psychotherapy, in MICHAEL J. LAMBERT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND 
BEHAVIOR CHANGE 311–81 (S.L. Garfield & A.E. Bergin eds., 5th ed. 2004)).  A 
therapist’s unconditional regard for the patient allows for therapeutic change.  Id. 
(citing Carl R. Rogers, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic 
Personality Change, 21 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 95 (1957)).  A strong working 
alliance has been demonstrated to result in positive outcomes and is viewed as the 
most fundamental factor of the therapeutic relationship.  Alliance is viewed as 
consisting of three components: an agreement on the goals of the relationship, an 
agreement on the tasks, and the development of an intimate bond between the 
parties with trust at the center.  Id. at 151 (citing Edward S. Bordin, The Generali-
zability of the Psychoanalytic Concept of the Working Alliance, 16 
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 252, 252–59 (1979)). 
358. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n, supra note 77, at 5. 
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tient trust,” which would pose “an insurmountable[] barrier to effec-
tive treatment.”359 
Moreover, like the clergy-penitent privilege, protecting the con-
fidentiality of the therapist-patient relationship is justified on huma-
nistic grounds, originating from an individual’s right to privacy.  
This right to privacy plays a central role in the therapeutic environ-
ment because full disclosure is an essential component of psychoa-
nalytic therapy, which assumes that conscious thoughts and feelings 
are caused by unconscious factors.360  Anna Freud has noted: “Con-
fidentiality of the material . . . is a prerequisite for free association.  
No [patient] succeeds in divesting himself of all defenses or controls 
unless he can be certain that the derivatives of his id will not become 
known beyond the confines of the analytic situation.”361  The disclo-
sure of this private personality, although necessary for successful 
treatment, could be “devastating if revealed to ordinary scrutiny.”362  
Finally, given the social stigma that remains attached to psychothe-
rapy, the mere disclosure that an individual is in therapy could be 
detrimental.363 
Thus, there are ample reasons that justify protection of confiden-
tial therapist-patient communications, just as there are with the other 
communication privileges.  However, only this privilege is subject to 
abrogation by a dangerous-patient/person exception, requiring a 
once-trusted confidant to testify in criminal proceedings against a 
  
359. Id.  Countless others have expressed the need for trust and openness in the 
therapeutic relationship for which confidentiality is the cornerstone.  See Honea-
Boles & Griffin, supra note 357, at 150.  Honea-Boles and Griffin present numer-
ous other works and studies which support the proposition that the stronger the 
therapeutic relationship, the more beneficial the therapy to the patient.  See id. 
360. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n, supra note 77, at 7–8.  It is through 
full disclosure and the process known as “free association” that the therapist and 
patient can successfully bring unconscious material “into the light of conscious-
ness.”  Id. at 9. 
361. Id. at 11 (quoting ANNA FREUD, THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 417 
(1968)). 
362. Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 
WAYNE L. REV. 175, 194 (1960).  The establishment of a psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is necessary because, in a psychotherapeutic situation, treatment is di-
rected towards feelings and attitudes that are unacceptable to the patient and to 
society.  Id. at 194–95. 
363. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n, supra note 77, at 4.  
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patient and allowing statements made within the confines of this 
confidential relationship to provide all the evidence that may be 
needed by the prosecution for a criminal conviction.  Thus, “reason 
and experience,” determined by comparison to these other commu-
nication privileges, do not support the recognition of a federal dan-
gerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  
VI. CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING ABROGATION OF THE PRIVILEGE  
A.  The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Should Be Abrogated  
Only In Certain Narrowly Prescribed Circumstances 
Many judges and legal scholars have taken the position that the 
dangerous-patient exception, as set forth by the Glass court, should 
not apply in criminal trials.364  They believe that testimony by a the-
rapist in a criminal trial, as to threats made by a patient in therapy, 
does not fulfill the criteria set forth in the Jaffee footnote.365  They 
argue that this type of evidence cannot serve to avert harm because 
the criminal proceedings take place long after the threats were made 
and because the sole purpose of any criminal proceeding is to punish 
the defendant for his prior acts.366  Nonetheless, many patients have 
been charged with crimes based solely on threats they made during 
therapy sessions.367  Indeed, all of the federal circuit court cases that 
have addressed the dangerous-patient exception were criminal cases 
where the proceedings originated from a therapist’s report.368  In 
these cases, the defendants were charged with violations of federal 
statutes that criminalize threats against federal officials or em-
ployees, and, in these cases, the therapist was the key witness, and 
sometimes the only witness, for the prosecution. 
Another concern that arises from using the Glass test as the crite-
ria for defining the dangerous-patient exception is the level of intru-
sion into the therapist-patient relationship and the amount of disclo-
  
364. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000). 
365. See id. 
366. See id. 
367. Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 716. 
368. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2003); Hayes, 227 
F.3d at 586; United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).  
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sure of patient confidences that occurs as a result.  This particular 
concern was initially addressed by the California Supreme Court in 
Tarasoff.369  In this case, the court recognized the importance of li-
miting the amount of disclosure of patients’ confidences, stating: 
“[T]he therapist’s obligations to his patient require that he not dis-
close a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert dan-
ger to others, and even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion 
that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent 
compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger.”370   
However, when a therapist is compelled to testify against a pa-
tient in an adversarial proceeding, such as a criminal trial, preserving 
the privacy of the patient is impossible.  Envision a situation where a 
patient threatens an identifiable third person during a therapy ses-
sion.  Assume that the therapist believes his patient poses a serious 
threat of harm and, in accordance with the “Tarasoff duty,” reports 
these threats to the authorities.  If the patient is subsequently charged 
with a crime, the therapist will most likely be called to testify at the 
criminal trial.  If the therapist testifies that he believed his patient’s 
threats were serious, the first prong of the Glass test, which requires 
a finding that the threat was “serious when it was uttered,” is met.371  
However, any challenge to the therapist’s testimony would necessi-
tate defense counsel’s inquiry into the reasons supporting the therap-
ist’s belief that the threats were serious.  In doing so, defense counsel 
opens the door to the disclosure of vast amounts of potentially highly 
prejudicial information, which otherwise would have remained privi-
leged.  
Because of the significant problems that arise when a therapist is 
compelled to testify against a patient, this testimony should only be 
required in certain, select situations.  One author has suggested that 
the privilege should only be abrogated if the patient presents a se-
rious threat of harm to himself or others and the disclosure by the 
psychotherapist will substantially advance the mental health interests 
  
369. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976). 
370. Id. 
371. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.  Under the objective test, a threat is considered 
serious when the threat “can reasonably be interpreted as a serious expression of 
intent to harm or assault the target.”  United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 
1018 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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of the patient.372  This approach would eliminate the second prong of 
the Glass test—the criterion that harm can be averted only by means 
of disclosure—and the confusion that arises when courts conflate the 
testimonial privilege with the “Tarasoff duty” to warn.  Limiting a 
therapist’s testimony to situations where the patient’s mental health 
would be served would appear to restrict this testimony to mental 
health commitment proceedings and, therefore, would not place a 
therapist in the compromising position of being a prosecutorial wit-
ness.   
It may be argued that even in this type of situation the therapist-
patient relationship will suffer because the patient will perceive the 
therapist’s testimony as being against his interests.  However, in 
commitment proceedings, a therapist retains the role as the patient’s 
advocate and is there to recommend a course of action that will serve 
the patient’s best interests.  Furthermore, although involuntary com-
mitment does involve a loss of freedom, there is a significant differ-
ence between punishment in the form of a prison sentence and the 
loss of freedom that results from involuntary hospitalization.  
Other scholars have identified additional circumstances in which 
this type of testimony might be appropriate.  Professor George Har-
ris, who has advocated for the compelled testimony of therapists at 
civil commitment proceedings, has also suggested that a therapist’s 
testimony might be appropriate in proceedings to secure restraining 
orders.373  He sees this type of proceeding as a necessary outgrowth 
of a therapist’s “Tarasoff duty” to protect potential victims from 
harm.374    
Dr. Paul Appelbaum has suggested that, in spite of the harm re-
sulting from the compelled testimony of therapists at a patient’s 
criminal trial, there may be occasions when this testimony may ac-
tually be the only means of averting harm.375  Sometimes commit-
ment proceedings or restraining orders are not enough to protect po-
tential victims.  Appelbaum believes this can occur when patients 
who pose long-term threats to other persons do not qualify for acute 
  
372. Daniel M. Buroker, Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Post-
Jaffee Confusion, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2004). 
373.  Harris, supra note 90, at 33.   
374. Id. at 63. 
375.  Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 714–16. 
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hospitalization, or because involuntarily committed patients may be 
released much sooner than they would be if they were imprisoned.376  
He argues that in these types of situations, incarceration may be the 
only means of protecting a potential victim and the testimony of a 
therapist could be essential to achieving this end.377  However, Ap-
pelbaum cautions that unless the line can be held, it would be prefer-
able not to abrogate the privilege with respect to dangerous patients 
“lest the exception overwhelm the general rule that patients’ com-
munications in therapy are deserving of protection.”378  
However, even in the type of situation Appelbaum describes, a 
therapist’s testimony may not be the only means of averting harm 
because, oftentimes, evidence of a patient’s threats is available from 
other, non-privileged sources.  In fact, a troubling aspect of the cases 
in which patients are prosecuted for threats made during therapy is 
that the government appears all too quick to subpoena the therapist 
and base its case principally on this testimonial evidence, while other 
means of proving a defendant’s threats may be readily available.  It 
is unlikely that an individual threatening the life of another person 
would only make these types of threatening statements during thera-
py.  It is far more likely that this person has communicated his 
threats to other individuals who can be produced to testify at trial.   
Even though Dr. Appelbaum has identified the circumstances 
under which he would allow the testimony of therapists at criminal 
trials, he has expressed concern that the most troubling aspect of the 
dangerous-patient exception is its “vulnerability to being used ex-
pansively for purposes beyond those originally envisioned.”379  In-
deed, one needs look no further than California for evidence of a 
court’s inability to hold this line.380  California, which has enacted a 
dangerous-patient exception into its evidence code, is a prime exam-
ple of how this exception has swallowed the privilege.   
California Evidence Code §1024 provides: 
  
376.  Id. 
377.  Id. 
378. Id. at 716. 
379. Id.  
380.  See, e.g., People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991). 
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There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist 
has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such 
mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself 
or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of 
the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened 
danger.381 
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute in People v. 
Wharton and held that the privilege itself never comes into existence 
if the statutory conditions are met.382  It noted: “[I]f a certain factual 
predicate exists (i.e., if the therapist believes the patient is a danger 
to another and disclosure is necessary to prevent the danger), the 
statute does not provide that the privilege is ‘waived’; it merely pro-
vides that ‘[t]here is no privilege.’”383  As a result of this interpreta-
tion, therapists in California have been compelled to testify in a wide 
variety of circumstances, well beyond situations where disclosure is 
“necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”384  Therapists are rou-
tinely required to testify in criminal proceedings and at death penalty 
hearings about threats made by their patients as proof of premedita-
tion.  Still other situations have been reported where entire therapy 
sessions have been stripped of their confidentiality once a threat was 
made.385 
A recent district court decision from the District of Maine, Unit-
ed States v. Hardy,386 further illustrates how easily these confidential 
communications can be stripped of their privileged status.387  In 
Hardy, the defendant entered an emergency room of a medical cen-
ter in May 2008.388  In the process of admission, he threatened to kill 
President Bush.389  He was transferred to another hospital for a psy-
  
381.  CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 2009). 
382. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 347.  The holding was reaffirmed a year later.  See 
Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992). 
383. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 312.  The court also held that confidential communica-
tions lose their privileged status once they have been disclosed to third parties.  Id. 
at 348. 
384. § 1024. 
385. Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 716. 
386. 640 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2009). 
387.  Id. at 77–78. 
388.  Id. at 77.  
389.  Id.  
File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3 Created on:  6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM 
398    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 3  
chiatric evaluation, where he continued to threaten the president.390  
The defendant was involuntarily committed, and his threats were 
immediately reported to law enforcement authorities.391  He re-
mained hospitalized in several different facilities for seven 
months.392  He was released in January 2009 and arrested five 
months later.393   
At trial, the government sought to compel the testimony of the 
defendant’s therapists as to the threats he made in May 2008.394  The 
court adopted the Glass test and found that the dangerous-patient 
exception permitted the therapists’ testimony.395  The court recog-
nized that the defendant was not arrested until five months after his 
release from the hospital and a year after he made the threats.396  
Nonetheless, it found that the dangerous-patient exception applied 
and required the therapists’ testimony at the criminal trial even 
though it never addressed the second prong of the Glass test—
whether the testimony was the only means of averting harm to the 
president.397 
The California experience and the Hardy case illustrate the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege’s vulnerability and the slippery slope 
towards its demise that is created once courts recognize the danger-
ous-patient exception to this privilege.  Experience to date seems to 
demonstrate that courts that have recognized this exception are una-
ble to contain and limit its use to the rare situations in which it might 
be justified.  Therefore, as Appelbaum has suggested, this exception 
should not be recognized, and courts, instead, should adhere to the 
rule that patients’ communications during therapy are deserving of 
protection.398   
  
390.  Id. at 78. 
391.  Id. 
392.  Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 78. 
393.  Id.  
394.  Id. at 79. 
395.  Id. at 79–80. 
396.  Id. at 80. 
397.  Id. at 80–81. 
398.  Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 714–16. 
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B.   The Appropriate Procedures and Burden of Proof  
If one is to accept that there are some situations where a therap-
ist’s testimony in a criminal trial is the only means of averting harm 
to third persons, courts should employ procedures designed to mi-
nimize the public exposure of patient confidential information when 
making this determination and in the other select situations which 
may call for a therapist’s testimony.  Consistent with Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104(a) and the Supreme Court decision United States v. 
Zolin,399 courts should utilize in camera inspection of the proffered 
evidence and require that any exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege be supported by a sufficient amount of proof.   
The existence and the scope of a privilege are questions to be de-
termined by the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a).400  The Rule also provides that in making this determination, 
a court is not bound by the rules of evidence, except the rules per-
taining to privileges.401  One interpretation of this rule would require 
that courts, in determining the existence or contour of a privilege, 
consider only non-privileged evidence.  However, the Supreme 
Court rejected this argument in Zolin.402  In Zolin, the Court held 
that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege need 
not be established by independent evidence.403  The Court refused to 
adopt an interpretation of Rule 104(a) that would treat the challenged 
communications as privileged for all intents and purposes.404  It 
found that the cost of imposing an absolute prohibition on the use of 
this evidence for the purpose of establishing the exception was “into-
  
399. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).   
400. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  Rule 104(a) provides: 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall 
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).  
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence ex-
cept those with respect to privileges. 
Id. 
401.  Id. 
402. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 566. 
403.  Id. at 568. 
404.  Id. at 566–68. 
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lerably high.”405  It stated: “A per se rule that the communications in 
question may never be considered creates, we feel, too great an im-
pediment to the proper functioning of the adversary process.”406 
The Court also held that, at the request of the party opposing the 
privilege, an in camera review may be used to ascertain whether 
purportedly privileged attorney-client communications would fall 
within the crime-fraud exception.407  The Court seemed cognizant of 
the practice in which federal prosecutors and civil litigants frequent-
ly invoked this exception in their attempts to defeat objections to 
discovery.408  With this in mind, and while also recognizing the need 
to protect “open and legitimate disclosure” between attorneys and 
clients, the Court held that before conducting an in camera review, 
the trial court should require a showing of a “factual basis adequate 
to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person . . . that in cam-
era review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the 
claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”409  The Court also 
held that this threshold requirement may be satisfied by means of 
any lawfully obtained evidence that has not been determined to be 
privileged.410  Finally, the Court reiterated its previous rulings that 
the disclosure of allegedly privileged materials in camera does not 
operate to waive or terminate the privilege.411 
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the approach espoused 
in Zolin and, in doing so, issued additional cautionary instructions to 
its lower courts, adding additional protection to the privilege.412  It 
considered the problems inherent in having judges view information 
that may be privileged when they are subsequently required to rule 
  
405.  Id. at 569. 
406. Id. 
407. The Court noted that the judge has discretion as to whether to conduct an in 
camera review.  Id. at 572.  In making its decision, the Court instructed the judge 
to consider the importance of the alleged privileged material to the case and the 
likelihood that the evidence produced through the in camera review will fall with-
in the crime-fraud exception.  Id. 
408. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.13.2, at 1185–86. 
409. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571–72. 
410.  Id. at 575. 
411.  Id. at 574–75. 
412.  In re Marriage of Decker, 606 N.E. 2d 1094, 1107–08 (Ill. 1992). 
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on an issue that may be affected by the privileged information.413  
The court suggested that once the threshold test for in camera review 
is established, a different judge should conduct the in camera inspec-
tion.414  The court also suggested that the in camera questioning be 
as narrow as possible to preserve the confidentiality of the informa-
tion.415   
The Eighth Circuit has also addressed this question and recom-
mended procedures that a trial court should follow when determining 
if the crime-fraud exception should apply.416  First, it noted that a 
district court does not need to conduct a formal hearing or accept 
additional evidence and argument once it determines that the excep-
tion does not apply.417  It also explained that, in the case of in cam-
era review, the party to the privilege has the absolute right to be 
heard by evidence and argument; the opposing party, however, shall 
not be privy to the confidential materials unless it has been estab-
lished that the crime-fraud exception applies.418  The court also ex-
plained that if the trial court finds that the exception applies, it 
should keep the privileged communications under seal to prevent 
any further disclosure until after all the appeals have been com-
pleted.419 
Of special concern is the level of proof under Rule 104(a) that is 
needed to establish an exception to a privilege.  In Clark v. United 
States,420 the Supreme Court indicated that a party opposing a privi-
lege must make a showing of a “prima facie case”421 to the court that 
  
413. See id. 
414.  Id. at 1107. 
415. Id. 
416. See In re General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 1998). 
417.  Id. at 716. 
418. Id. at 717. 
419. Id. 
420. 289 U.S. 1 (1933). 
421. Id. at 14.  “Prima facie” has been described as the “most rubbery” of legal 
phrases.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2005).  Prima 
facie evidence is defined as “evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is 
sufficient to sustain a judgment in factor of the case which it supports, but which 
may be contradicted by other evidence.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (9th ed. 
2009). 
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a privilege should be abrogated.422  Years later, in Bourjaily v. Unit-
ed States,423 a criminal case involving the co-conspirator exception 
to the hearsay rule, the Court held that preliminary questions of fact 
under Rule 104(a) must be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence.424  It stated: “The preponderance standard ensures that 
before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely 
than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due considera-
tion.”425  Unfortunately, the Zolin Court refused to address this ques-
tion with respect to the crime-fraud exception, although it did indi-
cate that a higher standard of proof is required for public disclosure 
of allegedly privileged information than for in camera review.426 
As the result of the Zolin Court’s refusal to address this question, 
the lower federal courts have continued to struggle with the question 
of the appropriate level of proof necessary to establish the crime-
fraud exception.  The standard of proof in cases in which the issue 
involved disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications 
to a grand jury has been defined in a variety of ways, including 
“some foundation in fact,” “reasonable basis,” and  “reasonable 
cause to believe.”427  Other courts have described this burden as the 
equivalent of a “prima facie” case,428 a finding of “probable 
cause,”429 or “more than suspicion but less than a preponderance of 
evidence.”430 
The Ninth Circuit recently held in In re Napster Inc. Copyright 
Litigation that a party asserting the crime-fraud exception to the at-
torney-client privilege in a civil case must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the exception applies.431  The Ninth Circuit 
found that requiring the existence of the crime-fraud exception to be 
  
422. Clark, 289 U.S. at 14. 
423. 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
424. Id. at 176. 
425. Id. at 175. 
426.  United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570–72 (1989). 
427. In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litigation, 479 F.3d 1078, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 
2007), abrogated by Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009). 
428. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49–50 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
429. In re John Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1994).  
430. United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996). 
431. 479 F.3d at 1095. 
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proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard is “consonant 
with the importance of the attorney-client privilege.”432  The court 
also commented: “It would be very odd if . . . a court could find such 
an important privilege vitiated where an exception to the privilege 
has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence.”433  
The court further supported its decision by noting the holding in 
Bourjaily that Rule 104 requires that preliminary questions of fact 
are to be determined by a preponderance of the evidence standard.434  
Finally, although the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
refused to address this specific question in Zolin, it indicated that it 
believed Zolin signaled that preliminary questions regarding privi-
leges should be established under Rule 104(a).435  In conclusion, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that judicious use of in camera review, com-
bined with a preponderance burden, strikes an appropriate balance 
between recognizing “the importance of the attorney-client privilege 
and deterrence of its abuse than a low threshold for outright disclo-
sure.”436 
Although the Napster court was careful to limit its holding to 
civil cases, the reasoning it provided to support its decision can be 
applied with equal force to criminal cases.437  Furthermore, this ap-
plication in criminal cases is particularly appropriate in light of the 
Supreme Court’s comment in Swidler & Berlin that “there is no case 
authority for the proposition that the [attorney-client] privilege ap-
plies differently in criminal and civil cases.”438 
Although these cases all involved the crime-fraud exception to 
the attorney-client privilege, there is no reason that these procedures 
should be restricted to cases involving the attorney-client privilege.  
The psychotherapist-patient privilege should stand on equal footing 
with the attorney-client privilege, and, as such, courts should not 
vitiate this important privilege absent a finding by a preponderance 




434.  Id. 
435. Id. at 1096. 
436. Id. 
437.  See In re Napster, 479 F.3d at 1096. 
438. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1998). 
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appear that any of the federal courts that addressed the dangerous-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege employed 
in camera procedures, nor is it apparent what standard of proof the 
courts applied.   
An unreported decision from the Southern District of Florida, 
United States v. Highsmith,439 illustrates a situation where these pro-
cedures should have been applied in order to preserve the confiden-
tiality of the therapist-patient communications.  In Highsmith, the 
court held that the dangerous-patient exception did not apply be-
cause it was not shown that the therapist’s testimony was the only 
means of averting harm.440  However, because the court did not en-
gage in in camera review of the evidence proffered by the govern-
ment to support its claim that the exception should apply, the confi-
dentiality of the patient’s disclosures was unnecessarily destroyed 
and the therapist-patient relationship was damaged as the result of 
the public exposure of privileged information.441 
The procedures recommended by the Zolin Court, and further 
developed by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, could be employed by 
  
439. No. 07-80093-CR, 2007 WL 2406990 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2007). 
440. Defendant Harry Nathaniel Highsmith was charged with threatening to kill 
an Administrative Law Judge employed by the Social Security Administration’s 
office of Hearings and Appeals.  Id. at *1.  In January 2007, the defendant volunta-
rily admitted himself into the Veteran’s Administration hospital in West Palm 
Beach, Florida, suffering from homicidal and suicidal ideations.  Id.  He was 
placed in a locked psychiatric unit.  Id.  During the first few days of his hospitali-
zation, he repeatedly expressed to his treating psychiatrist a plan to shoot the judge 
who had ruled against him in a Social Security proceeding.  Id.  He also indicated 
that he had a gun, which he planned to use to carry out his plan.  Id.  The psy-
chiatrist judged the threat to be credible and notified the judge and law enforce-
ment officials of the threat.  Highsmith, 2007 WL 2406990, at *1.  A few days 
later, the defendant’s suicidal and homicidal thoughts were resolved, and he was 
discharged from the hospital.  Id.  He was arrested immediately following his dis-
charge.  Id. at *2.  At trial, the prosecution sought to compel the testimony of his 
therapist.  Id.  The court adopted the Glass test but ruled that the criteria were not 
met.  Id. at *3–4.  It found that because the therapist had determined that the de-
fendant was no longer a threat at the time of his release, it would be inconsistent to 
conclude that this testimony would be the only means of averting the harm.  Id.  
Much of this information, which was freely disclosed and became part of the writ-
ten opinion in the case, could have been protected through the use of in camera 
procedures.   
441.  See id. at *3–4.  
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all courts called upon to determine if any exceptions to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege apply.  These procedures are particularly 
important in jurisdictions that have recognized the dangerous-patient 
exception because they guard against the needless public disclosure 
of confidential patient information and protect the confidentiality of 
the therapist-patient relationship, which the Jaffee Court recognized 
is a “sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.”442 
Therefore, in cases where a party seeks to compel a therapist to 
testify as to communications made by a patient during therapy, a 
court should follow the Zolin procedure and require a threshold 
showing of a factual basis sufficient to support a good faith belief 
that in camera review of the information will reveal evidence to es-
tablish an exception to the privilege.  The court may then conduct an 
in camera inspection of the privileged information only if it deter-
mines that this initial burden has been met.  Moreover, the proponent 
of the exception should have the burden of proving the dangerous-
patient exception by a preponderance of the evidence.  In jurisdic-
tions that have recognized the dangerous-patient exception, the bur-
den should be squarely on the government to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the patient’s threats were serious when 
made and that the testimony of the therapist at the criminal trial is 
the only means of averting harm.  Furthermore, in demonstrating that 
the therapist’s testimony is the “only” means of averting the harm, 
the government should be required to show that it put forth reasona-
ble efforts to locate other forms of proof and that the evidence 
needed to establish this criterion is not available through any other 
means.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but 
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better 
than no privilege at all.”443 
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court, operating under the authority 
granted to it by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which allows federal 
  
442.  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
443. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
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courts to recognize new privileges by interpreting “common law 
principles . . . in the light of reason and experience,”444 held that a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized in the federal 
courts.445  The Court found that important public and private inter-
ests are served by protecting the confidences of patients in therapy 
because effective psychotherapy demands “an atmosphere of confi-
dence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and 
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.”446  It 
also recognized that: “The mental health of our citizenry, no less 
than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent impor-
tance.”447  
However, much confusion has arisen as the result of the Court’s 
offhand remarks in footnote 19 of the opinion, and this confusion 
threatens the continued viability of the privilege.448  In situations 
where a patient has made threatening statements against federal offi-
cials or federal employees during therapy, and where the therapist 
reported such threats to law enforcement authorities pursuant to state 
law, these patients have found themselves charged with violations of 
federal criminal laws.  Federal prosecutors, seizing upon these re-
ports as a convenient means of obtaining evidence, seek to have 
courts compel the testimony of these therapists at the patient’s crim-
inal trial.  This testimony is often the only evidence the prosecution 
needs to secure a conviction.    
This article has argued against the recognition of the dangerous-
patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  Simply 
put, there is little legal support or justification for the exception other 
than the Jaffee Court’s casual dicta.  This exception is not justified 
by “reason and experience.”  There is no support in the legislative 
history of Rule 501.  Indeed, the contrary is true.  Neither the expe-
rience of the states, nor the developed body of federal common law 
with respect to the other communication privileges, provides justifi-
cation for the exception.  Moreover, this exception requires courts to 
engage in a case-by-case balancing test—a procedure that was spe-
  
444. Id. at 8 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). 
445.  Id. at 9–10.  
446. Id. at 10. 
447. Id. at 11. 
448.  See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19. 
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cifically rejected by the Jaffee Court because “[m]aking the promise 
of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of 
the relative importance of the patient’s interests in privacy and the 
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of 
the privilege.”449  
The guiding principle behind the Jaffee Court’s decision to rec-
ognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege was to protect the confi-
dentiality of patient disclosures in therapy with the goal of improv-
ing the nation’s mental health.  The important policies served by this 
privilege are threatened by the dangerous-patient exception, which 
has the demonstrated potential for significant abuse if not curtailed 
and could lead to a general erosion of the privilege.  Instead, courts 
should adopt the approach that preserves and protects this vital privi-
lege and the special relationships to which it is attached.   
 
  
 449. Id. at 17. 
